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 ENERGY RE-INVESTMENT 
HARI M. OSOFSKY,* JACQUELINE PEEL,** BRETT MCDONNELL***  
AND ANITA FOERSTER**** 
Despite worsening climate change threats, investment in energy—in the United 
States and globally—is dominated by fossil fuels. This Article provides a novel 
analysis of two pathways in corporate and securities law that together have the 
potential to shift patterns of energy investment.  
The first pathway targets current investments and corporate decision-making. It 
includes efforts to influence investors to divest from owning shares in fossil fuel 
companies and to influence companies to address climate change risks in their 
internal decision-making processes. This pathway has received increasing attention, 
especially in light of the Paris Agreement and the Trump Administration’s decision 
to withdraw from it. But, alone, it will not be enough to foster transition to a cleaner 
mix of energy sources. 
Key to achieving this goal of energy reinvestment is a second pathway focused on 
fostering investments in new companies innovating in clean energy. This pathway 
—which has received far less attention—uses emerging legal mechanisms to support 
greater investment in entrepreneurial clean energy ventures. The Article’s analysis 
of this pathway looks beyond the well-established ways in which subsidies support 
fossil fuels and renewable energy. It instead examines the significance for energy 
reinvestment of changes in U.S. securities regulation permitting greater 
crowdsourcing of investment and in state laws allowing for new types of 
corporations. 
This Article is the first to examine how these two pathways can synergistically 
promote energy reinvestment. The first pathway moves money away from fossil fuels, 
while the second helps to spur needed reinvestment. The Article proposes strategies 
for deploying the tools in the two pathways together, taking into account the 
motivations and constraints of diverse investors and corporations.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In the lead up to and aftermath of President Trump’s June 1, 2017, withdrawal 
from the Paris Agreement, numerous business leaders—including of fossil fuel 
majors like Shell Oil—expressed their support for the agreement and dismay at his 
decision.1 They not only sent letters to him but also took out collective 
advertisements in the New York Post, New York Times, and Wall Street Journal.2 At 
the same time, in May 2017, 217 investors representing over $15 trillion in assets 
sent a joint letter to the governments of the G7 and G20 urging their continued 
support for and implementation of the Paris Agreement.3 A 2018 report prepared by 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Ben Popken, Big Business Urges Trump To Stick with Paris Climate Accord, NBC 
NEWS (May 31, 2017, 5:45 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/big 
-business-urges-trump-stick-paris-climate-accord-n766641 [https://perma.cc/QE33-PXPN]; 
Julia Horowitz & Jethro Mullen, Top CEOs Tell the CEO President: You’re Wrong on Paris, 
CNN MONEY (June 2, 2017, 12:43 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/06/01/news/ceos 
-respond-trump-paris-agreement/index.html [https://perma.cc/9UJP-47LG]; Abigail Abrams 
& Lucinda Chen, ‘Climate Change is Real’: Business Leaders React to President Trump’s 
Withdrawal from Paris Agreement, FORTUNE (June 2, 2017, 8:54 AM), http://fortune.com 
/2017/06/01/paris-climate-agreement-business-leaders-react/ [https://perma.cc/Z77S-UBLM].  
 2. Business Support for the Paris Agreement, CTR. FOR ENERGY & CLIMATE SOLS., 
https://www.c2es.org/international/business-support-paris-agreement [https://perma.cc 
/VG7C-6WH5].  
 3. ABP ET AL., LETTER FROM GLOBAL INVESTORS TO GOVERNMENTS OF THE G7 AND G20 
NATIONS (May 8, 2017), https://www.ceres.org/sites/default/files/Fact%20Sheets%20or 
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the World Economic Forum reinforces the growing perception that climate change 
impacts are one of the most significant risks to global business.4 
Despite strong public statements, however, the reality is that fossil fuels continue 
to dominate energy markets.5 For the past century, petroleum, coal, and natural gas 
have provided more than 80% of the energy consumed in the United States, and 
energy investments reflect that.6 The most fundamental market shift in recent years 
has been the evolution in which of these fossil fuels is dominant. The technological 
breakthrough of combining hydraulic fracturing with horizontal drilling allowed for 
large quantities of shale oil and gas to be extracted cheaply.7 This expansion of 
accessible natural gas and the resulting drop in its price, paired with regulatory and 
litigation efforts to shift the energy mix away from coal, has resulted in natural gas 
playing a greater role in U.S. and global electricity markets.8 
Against this backdrop, this Article provides a novel analysis of two pathways in 
corporate and securities law that together have the potential to change patterns of 
energy investment. The first pathway targets current investments and corporate 
decision-making. It includes efforts to influence investors to divest from owning 
shares of such companies and to influence companies to address climate change risks 
                                                                                                                 
 
%20misc%20files/Updated%20Global%20Investor%20Letter%20to%20G7%20%26%20G2
0%20Governments.pdf [https://perma.cc/UPR6-7CEB].  
 4. WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE GLOBAL RISKS OF 2018: 13TH EDITION (2018), 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GRR18_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EVF-MU84].  
 5. Mariana Mazzucato & Gregor Semieniuk, Financing Renewable Energy: Who Is 
Financing What and Why It Matters, 127 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 8, 8 (2018). 
 6. Id.; Fossil Fuels Still Dominate U.S. Energy Consumption Despite Recent Market 
Share Decline, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 1, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy 
/detail.php?id=26912 [https://perma.cc/6MDB-B4KL]; cf. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2018 (2018) (providing a detailed assessment of future trends in 
energy markets and reinforcing the key role of natural gas consumption), 
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/AEO2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PG7-6FL6].  
 7. For a discussion of this expansion, see INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, GAS 2017: ANALYSIS 
AND FORECASTS TO 2022 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2–5 (2017); cf. ALAN J. KRUPNICK & ISABEL 
ECHARTE, ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF UNCONVENTIONAL OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT 14–24 
(2017) (describing economic impact of shale gas on communities). The Department of Energy 
describes the process of horizontal drilling combined with hydraulic fracturing as follows: 
The shallow section of shale wells are drilled vertically (much like a traditional 
conventional gas well). Just above the target depth—the place where the shale 
gas formation exists—the well deviates and becomes horizontal. At this location, 
horizontal wells can be oriented in a direction that maximizes the number of 
natural fractures intersected in the shale. These fractures can provide additional 
pathways for the gas that is locked away in the shale, once the hydraulic 
fracturing operation takes place. 
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, HOW IS SHALE GAS PRODUCED? (2013), https://www.energy.gov/sites 
/prod/files/2013/04/f0/how_is_shale_gas_produced.pdf [https://perma.cc/CCC3-AWRX].  
 8. See BP, BP STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD ENERGY 1–7 (66th ed. 2017), https://www 
.bp.com/content/dam/bp-country/de_ch/PDF/bp-statistical-review-of-world-energy-2017 
-full-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/AB6G-NJHR]; Pilita Clark, BP Highlights ‘Decisive’ Shift 
Away from Coal Power, FIN. TIMES (June 13, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/da6a53da 
-5049-11e7-a1f2-db19572361bb; Moving Beyond Coal, by the Numbers, SIERRA CLUB, 
https://content.sierraclub.org/coal/victories [https://perma.cc/8XGF-N253].  
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in their internal decision-making processes. This pathway has received increasing 
attention in the media and scholarly literature, especially in light of the Paris 
Agreement and the Trump Administration’s decision to withdraw from it.9 Corporate 
risk disclosure, shareholder proposals, and fiduciary duties all create opportunities 
for risk internalization; at the same time, a number of major corporations and 
investors have supported the Paris Agreement or the broader energy divestment 
movement aimed at shifting investment out of fossil fuels.10 
The second pathway focuses on fostering investments in new companies that are 
innovating in clean energy. It harnesses evolving corporate and securities laws that 
create new opportunities for entrepreneurial energy investment. This reinvestment 
pathway has received far less attention in this context.11 But it is equally significant 
for our energy future. How we encourage new ideas to develop and get to market 
influences the pace at which, and sometimes whether, breakthroughs happen.12 
Beyond the well-established mechanisms of subsidies, which are crucial to the 
dominance of fossil fuels as well as to renewable energy development, the 
broadening of who can invest and the creation of new corporate forms provide 
opportunities for entrepreneurs to shift investment into newer start-ups focused on 
clean energy.13 Regulation promulgated pursuant to the JOBS Act allows for greater 
                                                                                                                 
 
 9. For examples of some recent articles, see Eric J. Risley, Jr., Sound and Fury, 
Signifying Nothing: Why Shareholder Suits Are Ineffective To Promote Corporate Response 
to Climate CHANGE, 44 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 391 (2017); Carlton Tarpley, How 
Shareholders Can Fill an Environmental Regulatory Void, GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. (Jan. 29, 
2017), https://gelr.org/2017/01/29/how-shareholders-can-fill-an-environmental-regulatory 
-void/ [https://perma.cc/YR76-V5LR]. 
 10. This pathway is explored in depth in Part II. Divestment refers to the withdrawal of 
investment (generally, selling an asset) in order to support social or political goals. It was a 
major strategy during the anti-apartheid movement, and current efforts around fossil fuels are 
often framed in reference to that movement and debates over its effectiveness. See, e.g., 
William MacAskill, Does Divestment Work?, NEW YORKER (Oct. 20, 2015), https://www 
.newyorker.com/business/currency/does-divestment-work [https://perma.cc/98ME-WD5F] 
(arguing that divestment is ineffective in addressing share prices but can generate social 
stigma); Rebecca Leber, Divestment Won’t Hurt Big Oil and That’s OK, NEW REPUBLIC (May 
20, 2015), https://newrepublic.com/article/121848/does-divestment-work [https:// 
perma.cc/AV7A-PLNX] (same). Current #BoycottNRA efforts in the aftermath of the Florida 
school shooting provide another example of divestment strategies. See Jacey Fortin, A List of 
Companies Cutting Ties with the N.R.A., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2018), https://www 
.nytimes.com/2018/02/24/business/nra-companies-boycott.html [https://perma.cc/VS9R-
3AC8]; Julie Creswell & Tiffany Hsu, Companies Cut Ties to the N.R.A., But Find There Is 
No Neutral Ground, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018 
/02/23/business/nra-boycott.html [https://perma.cc/MQV4-E62G]. 
 11. For an example of the focus on the first pathway in the public dialogue about climate 
change investments, see Christopher P. Skroupa, Investing in the Age of Climate Change, 
FORBES (Oct. 12, 2017, 4:04 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherskroupa/2017/10 
/12/investing-in-the-age-of-climate-change/#6934f1b71825 [https://perma.cc/E8DJ-UFBM]. 
 12. For a discussion of how business innovation and policy interact, see Eric Biber, Sarah 
E. Light, J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Regulating Business Innovation as Policy Disruption: 
From the Model T to Airbnb, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1561, 1587–1603 (2017). 
 13. For an example analysis of crowdfunding of renewable energy projects, see Adrian 
Chiang, How Entrepreneurs Can Crowdfund Renewable Energy Projects, 8 J. BUS. 
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crowdsourcing of investment,14 and state law permitting public benefit corporations, 
which have dual goals of profit and helping society,15 provide interesting 
opportunities for energy innovation.16 
This Article is the first to examine how these pathways can operate synergistically 
to shift energy investment and foster transition in the private sector to clean energy. 
The first pathway focuses on the risks associated with fossil fuels, but it does not 
always shift investment into clean energy technology. The second one is crucial for 
helping to spur not just divestment, but also reinvestment. The Article argues that 
what is needed is a holistic approach that amplifies the effects of efforts to shift 
investment out of fossil fuels by providing avenues for reinvestment in clean energy 
technology. Shifting investments away from fossil fuels will be far more effective if 
paired with efforts to encourage research into, and market expansion of, technologies 
that support a transition to a lower carbon economy.  
The Article considers the role of these two pathways in both external investment 
and internal corporate decision-making. External investment (also referred to as 
capital investment) involves the investment of money or other resources into a 
business—through buying shares or extending credit—by external investors.17 
Internal decision-making (also referred to as asset investment or asset allocation) 
involves choices by individual companies about how to deploy their financial and 
other resources and about what sort of product or service mix to produce.18  
The following table depicts the ways in which the pathways focused on shifting 
existing investments and fostering new investments interact with internal and 
external choices, and the associated legal strategies discussed in this Article. The 
upper right cell of the table represents the second pathway’s strategies aimed at 
fostering investment by outside investors in newer companies that are innovating in 
clean energy. The other three cells represent the strategies of the first pathway, which 
focus on both shifting external investment away from fossil fuels and shifting internal 
resource allocation. As the table illustrates, both external investment and internal 
decision-making play an important role in transitions in sources of energy, how 
efficiently energy is used, and what technologies are being considered. 
                                                                                                                 
 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 659, 680–83 (2015). 
 14. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 
(2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). As discussed in depth in 
Section III.A, the JOBS Act amends securities law in ways that provide additional 
opportunities for investment. 
 15. For a discussion of these emerging corporate forms, see Robert A. Katz & Antony 
Page, The Role of Social Enterprise, 35 VT. L. REV. 59, 86–93 (2010); Heerad Sabeti, The 
For-Benefit Enterprise, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 2011), https://hbr.org/2011/11/the-for 
-benefit-enterprise [https://perma.cc/825U-MBDX]. Section III.B discusses their role in 
corporate reinvestment in depth. 
 16. This pathway is explored in depth in Part III. 
 17. See Kimberlee Leonard, Examples of Capital Investment, CHRON (Aug. 28, 2018), 
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/examples-capital-investment-54295.html [https://perma.cc 
/H8KC-BKE4].  
 18. Mitch Tuchman, Investing Basics: What Is Asset Allocation?, FORBES (Mar. 20, 2015, 
9:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mitchelltuchman/2015/03/20/investing-basics-what 
-is-asset-allocation/#651671e70d17 [https://perma.cc/YS4E-GUHF].  
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Table: Divestment and Reinvestment Pathways19 
 Divestment Reinvestment 
External Goal:  
Shifting existing investments. 
Action:  
External investors take 
money or other resources out of 
companies excessively exposed 
to climate change risk (e.g., 
University endowment divests 
from Exxon). 
Legal tools:  
Securities disclosure, which 
allows investors to determine 
risk exposure of potential 
divestment target companies. 
Interpretations of duties that 
enable consideration of climate 
change. 
Goal:  
Fostering new investments. 
Action: 
External investors invest 
money or other resources in 
companies that are focused on 
renewable energy (e.g., 
Charitable foundation focused 
on sustainability makes low-
interest loan to solar power 
company as part of PRI 
program). 
Legal tools: 
Benefit corporation statutes 
helping identify companies 
focused on public goals. 
JOBS Act encouraging 
crowdfunding. 
Internal Goal:  
Shifting existing investments.  
Action:  
Companies move internal 
resources away from fossil fuel 
investments (e.g., Utility de-
commissions coal plant before 
end of economic life). 
Legal tools: 
Shareholder proposal 
requesting utility to de-
commission coal plants. 
Shareholder fiduciary duty 
suit claiming company 
excessively exposed to climate 
change risk because too heavily 
invested in fossil fuels. 
Securities disclosure, 
focusing company attention on 
financial risks posed by energy 
transition. 
Goal:  
Shifting existing investments. 
Action:  
Companies move internal 
resources into renewable energy 
investments (e.g., utility invests 
in solar power farm). 
Legal tools: 
Shareholder proposal 
requesting utility to invest in 
renewable energy resources. 
Securities disclosure, 
focusing company attention on 
financial opportunities 
associated with energy 
transition. 
 
This strategic pairing of the two pathways needs to be grounded in the complexity 
of the energy system transition. As Section I.C. explores in depth, fossil fuels vary 
                                                                                                                 
 
 19. These pathways are explored in depth in Parts II and III.  
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in how much carbon dioxide their burning contributes to the atmosphere, and natural 
gas makes a significantly lower contribution than coal.20 Low-carbon sources of 
energy bring other risks and externalities—for example, in the context of nuclear 
energy, accidents and difficulties of storing waste—that consumers and regulators 
may care about.21 Many crucial technologies for energy transition, such as energy 
storage, are still working towards being able to support large-scale markets.22 
Reasonable people disagree on the best way forward, and options will evolve over 
time as technology, markets, and law develops. 
This Article considers the possibilities and limitations in current developments 
focused on shifting existing energy investments away from fossil fuels and how these 
efforts can be leveraged to foster new clean energy investments. It also analyzes how 
different categories of companies and investors might take advantage of divestment 
and reinvestment strategies to foster more effective private sector energy transition.  
Part I examines the complex context in which external investment and internal 
resource decisions take place. There are many types of energy markets and investors, 
which have different goals and constraints; they are also influenced by the physical 
characteristics of energy and many types of law relevant to energy. Investment 
decisions by private actors are only one part of how projects gain financial support; 
public finance also plays a huge role, as do laws that subsidize particular energy 
sectors. Corporate actors making internal energy choices vary widely, from ones 
whose business model is tied to particular sources of energy to those, like Target or 
Best Buy, that simply are significant users of energy. And people disagree on what 
“clean energy” is, how the energy system should transition, and what reinvestment 
would be most helpful in supporting that transition. This context helps to frame the 
possibilities and constraints for using corporate and securities law to spur 
reinvestment. 
Part II focuses on the first pathway towards reinvestment that seeks to shift 
investment by both external investors and companies away from fossil fuels. It 
                                                                                                                 
 
 20. How Much Carbon Dioxide Is Produced When Different Fuels Are Burned?, U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 8, 2017), https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=73&t=11 
[https://perma.cc/CTZ6-QZU5]. 
 21. For analyses of safety, see CHARLES MILLER, AMY CUBBAGE, DANIEL DORMAN, JACK 
GROBE, GARY HOLAHAN & NATHAN SANFILIPPO, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING 
REACTOR SAFETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE REVIEW OF INSIGHTS 
FROM THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI ACCIDENT 25–50 (2011); WORLD HEALTH ORG., HEALTH RISK 
ASSESSMENT FROM THE NUCLEAR ACCIDENT AFTER THE 2011 GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE 
AND TSUNAMI BASED ON PRELIMINARY DOSE ESTIMATION 7–9 (2013); Emily Hammond, 
Nuclear Power, Risk, and Retroactivity, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1059, 1068–71 (2015); 
Amanda Leiter, The Perils of a Half-Built Bridge: Risk Perception, Shifting Majorities, and 
the Nuclear Power Debate, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 31, 58–64 (2008). For analyses of the waste 
issue, see WILLIAM M. ALLEY & ROSEMARIE ALLEY, TOO HOT TO TOUCH: THE PROBLEM OF 
HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE  3–169 (2013); MASS. INST. OF TECH., THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR 
POWER: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY MIT STUDY 10 (2003); J. SAMUEL WALKER, THE ROAD TO 
YUCCA MOUNTAIN: THE DEVELOPMENT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE POLICY IN THE UNITED 
STATES 76–94 (2009). 
 22. Ben Schiller, Large-Energy Storage Is the (Virtual) Power Plant of the Future, FAST 
CO. (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/3069217/large-scale-energy-storage-is-
the-virtual-power-plant-of-the-future [https://perma.cc/7VVC-UZ8V]. 
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discusses the evolving legal tools, and their constraints, for enhancing internal 
reallocation of assets by private sector entities (asset reinvestment) and shifting 
capital away from fossil fuels by external investors (capital reinvestment). Some 
tools, such as shareholder proposals and corporate disclosure requirements, aim at 
creating more transparency around companies’ decisions on how they manage 
climate risk and their energy-related asset portfolios. These tools have achieved some 
modest success to date in improving corporate disclosure of climate risk. But their 
capacity to generate the kind of deeper cultural change in businesses that might 
motivate strong climate action is uncertain, at least so long as corporate law rules 
continue to place primacy on shareholder wealth maximization over long-term risk 
management. For its part, the divestment movement has primarily relied on nonlegal 
tools such as public media campaigns and advocacy to advance its objectives. 
However, over the longer term, its success in encouraging investors to divest from 
fossil fuels is intimately linked to the scope of the legal fiduciary duties owed by 
investment fund managers (like pension trustees) and directors of companies to their 
respective members and shareholders (duties which may promote socially 
responsible clean energy investment in some cases but retard it in others).  
Part III turns to consider the clean energy reinvestment side of the equation, which 
has received far less attention from climate advocates and legal scholars. Much of 
the literature in this field has focused on targeted tools like government subsidies and 
tax breaks for renewable energy projects. However, broader developments in 
corporate and securities law, linked to ideas of social entrepreneurship, may also be 
important drivers of clean energy investment, although their application in this area 
remains largely untested. Examples include securities law reforms that may broaden 
crowdfunding opportunities for clean technology and vehicles for social enterprise 
such as public benefit corporations. This Part argues that these tools could work 
together with longstanding efforts to encourage socially responsible investment, as 
well as the corporate and securities law mechanisms discussed in Part II, and serve 
as important pieces of supporting a shift towards clean energy investment. 
The Article concludes with an examination of options for bringing efforts to move 
investment away from fossil fuels into closer alignment with those that would 
support reinvestment in clean energy. It maps how the different pathways to energy 
divestment and reinvestment interact. It then considers how the varying constraints 
and interests of external investors and companies will likely shape their receptiveness 
to efforts along each of the two pathways described in the Article. In so doing, it 
identifies four potential categories of investors and companies: Responsive, 
Receptive, Reluctant and Recalcitrant. This matrix provides a basis for better 
targeting of strategies for energy reinvestment, which will be essential in fostering 
effective energy transition in the private sector. 
I. THE ROLE OF INVESTMENT AND CORPORATE DECISION-MAKING 
IN ENERGY TRANSITION 
This Article focuses on the current and potential role of corporate and securities 
law in spurring internal and external energy reinvestment choices. However, the 
pathways outlined in Parts II and III occur against a complex backdrop. There are 
markets and investments in each source of energy, the secondary systems that use 
them (such as electricity and transportation), and in predictions of energy prices in 
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the future.23 These markets take place against a backdrop of governmental decisions 
that help to financially support or undermine sectors of the energy industry.24 A wide 
range of investors with different rules and drivers participate in those markets.25 
Moreover, every company uses energy in some way, and so even companies that do 
not have energy as a core business focus make decisions that impact how much and 
what types of energy are needed.26 Finally, disagreement exists over which sources 
of energy are “clean” and what type of reinvestment is needed.27 
This backdrop structures the constructive role that corporate and securities law 
can play in energy reinvestment. For pathways encouraging both divestment and 
reinvestment to be effective, they must have clarity about what the intervention into 
this complex system is trying to accomplish. As Parts II and III explore in depth, 
actions that gain a lot of public attention, like divestment by major institutional 
investors, may have limited impact on the overall flow of energy investment if not 
paired strategically with other mechanisms. 
A. Complexity of Energy Markets 
The energy system involves a complex interaction of physical, market, and 
regulatory elements. Sources of energy—coal, natural, gas, oil, nuclear, and 
renewables—have varying (1) physical characteristics, (2) markets that trade in 
them, and (3) statutes and regulations at multiple levels of government that apply to 
them.28 The secondary systems that use these sources of energy—electricity and 
transportation dominate—similarly involve different physical challenges, markets, 
and legal regimes.29 For example, U.S. electricity markets are structured through 
varying regional transmission organizations and entities at the multi-state wholesale 
level and state law at a more local level.30 Markets relevant to transportation vary 
significantly from electricity ones and include fuels, vehicles, and underlying 
infrastructure.31 
Focusing primarily on the market aspect of the energy system does not eliminate 
this complexity because the markets themselves reflect this diversity. As the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission explains: 
Energy markets involve both physical and financial elements. The 
physical markets contain the natural resources, infrastructure, 
institutions and market participants involved in producing energy and 
delivering it to consumers. They also include the trading of and payment 
for the physical commodity - e.g., natural gas. The financial markets 
                                                                                                                 
 
 23. See infra Section I.A. 
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include the buying and selling of financial products derived from the 
physical energy. These financial markets also include market structures 
and institutions, market participants, products and trading, and have their 
own drivers of supply and demand. In general, physical and financial 
markets can be distinguished by the products and by the intentions of the 
market participants involved. Physical products are those whose 
contracts involve the physical delivery of the energy. Physical market 
participants are those who are in the market to make or take delivery of 
the commodity. Financial products usually do not involve the delivery of 
natural gas, electricity, or oil; instead, they involve the exchange of 
money.32 
Energy reinvestment involves both physical and financial markets, as they together 
affect how different sectors are supported and incentivized.  
Moreover, these markets operate in a context in which governmental regulatory 
decisions are influencing supply, demand, and prices. For example, the U.S. 
government subsidizes both fossil fuels and renewable energy through tax 
incentives.33 The process of tax reform in 2017 suggests that both kinds of subsidies 
are likely to continue.34 The first version of the tax bill would have significantly cut 
back renewable energy subsidies.35 This would have been devastating to those 
industries—tax-equity financing supports approximately two-thirds of wind and 
three-quarters of solar projects.36 However, both tax-equity investors and renewable 
energy companies expressed their concerns, and significant wind industry in key 
states with Republican legislators helped to largely eliminate those rollbacks in the 
final bill.37 These interactions mirror others highlighted by Hari Osofsky and 
Jacqueline Peel in their work on energy partisanship, which indicates that real 
economic alignment and corporate decision-making can play key roles in 
overcoming partisan divides.38 
The pathways to divestment from carbon-intensive sources and reinvestment in 
“cleaner” sources thus should involve shifts in multiple kinds of markets. Strategies 
to motivate those shifts under corporate and securities law need to take into account 
the complex interplay of physical constraints, markets, and regulation. 
B. Types of Energy Investors and Companies 
Corporations, other than emerging new forms described in Section III.B, are 
largely driven by profit motives in every sector of the energy industry, from 
                                                                                                                 
 
 32. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, ENERGY PRIMER: A HANDBOOK OF ENERGY 
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 33. See David M. Schizer, Energy Subsidies: Worthy Goals, Competing Priorities and 
Flawed Institutional Design, 70 TAX L. REV. 243, 273–76 (2017). 
 34. Brad Plumer, Tax Bill Largely Preserves Incentives for Wind and Solar Power, N.Y. 
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 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
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 38. Hari M. Osofsky & Jacqueline Peel, Energy Partisanship, 65 EMORY L.J. 695 (2016). 
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extraction to electricity generation and transportation.39 Investment is crucial to 
corporations having the capital to operate and develop new projects. The availability 
of investment funds helps structure which industries thrive or fail and how the energy 
sector transitions over time.40  
A mixed picture emerges from the latest research on investment trends and their 
implications for energy transition. On the one hand, fossil fuel investments are far 
more extensive than renewable energy ones. In 2013, renewable energy investments 
represented only 16% of the $1.6 trillion total energy sector investments globally, 
and investment in power sector fossil fuels rose 7% from 2013 to 2014.41 On the 
other hand, renewable energy finance has grown substantially, from $45 billion in 
2004 to $270 billion in 2014, across the various stages of the innovation chain, from 
research and development (R&D) to full-scale market deployment.42 Although the 
percentages of renewable energy investment remain low compared to fossil fuels, the 
2014 net investment into new renewable energy capacity was twice as large as for 
fossil fuels.43 More recent data suggests similarly complex trends:  
Investment in renewables excluding large hydro fell by 23% to $241.6 
billion, but the amount of new capacity installed increased from 
127.5GW in 2015 to a record 138.5GW in 2016. Together, the new 
renewable sources of wind, solar, biomass and waste, geothermal, small 
hydro and marine accounted for 55.3% of all the gigawatts of new power 
generation added worldwide last year.44  
And as renewable energy investment has grown, deployment has as well.45  
A wide range of investors participate in energy markets. Public finance plays an 
important role globally in supporting energy projects and determining patterns of 
energy development; according to a new report by environmental nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), G20 countries are providing four times as much fossil fuel 
funding as renewable energy funding.46 In the private finance context that is the focus 
of this Article, a 2013 Climate Policy Initiative report indicates that “[t]he big prize 
is institutional investors – pension funds, insurance companies, and other long-term 
investors – whose $71 trillion in assets form one of the largest pools of private capital 
in the world, leading policy makers to ask whether institutional investors could help 
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meet the climate change funding challenge.”47 Another major type of institutional 
investor in those markets is mutual funds.48These institutional investors are 
particularly crucial in public markets, like the New York Stock Exchange or 
Nasdaq.49  
Other types of private investors also play a key role in the direction of energy 
investment, particularly angel investors and venture capital funds.50 These are 
particularly important for investments in closely held businesses whose stock is not 
traded on public markets.51 They are thus crucial for the types of investments and 
companies we discuss in Part III. Another significant category of institutional 
investors, hedge funds, covers a range of investment funds that follow quite varied 
strategies and have an important presence in both public and private markets.52  
Corporations vary in how crucial carbon intensive energy sources are to their 
business models. In the energy sector, even within fossil fuel companies, there is 
great variation, for example, between coal versus oil and natural gas companies 
versus renewable energy companies.53 Car companies tend to be relatively neutral 
about what kind of cars they make, and equally, utilities are often relatively neutral 
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about energy sources other than needing to recoup infrastructure investments.54 In 
other sectors, there is also significant variation, but generally, companies are able to 
make shifts in sourcing of energy and deploy energy efficiency measures.55  
C. Disagreements over the Definition of “Clean” Energy and Needed Transition 
In the U.S. context, which is the legal focus of this Article, energy consumption 
continues to be dominated by fossil fuels—80% in 2017, as depicted in the following 
chart from the U.S. Energy Information Administration.56  
 
 
However, the shift in which fossil fuels are being used—paired with energy 
efficiency, renewables growth, and a recession—caused a decline in greenhouse gas 
emissions.57 The primary greenhouse gas being reduced through fossil fuel shifting 
is carbon dioxide, which, though not the most potent greenhouse gas, represented 
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81% of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in 2015.58 The following chart, also from the 
U.S. Energy Information Administration, depicts that decline. 59 
 
This shift, due to switching among fossil fuels, is at the core of the debate over 
what constitutes clean energy. Coal burned for fuel produces almost twice the carbon 
dioxide emissions of natural gas, and so the shift to a greater share of natural gas in 
energy production has significantly decreased emissions.60 However, natural gas is 
still a fossil fuel, with a larger carbon footprint than either nuclear or renewable 
energy sources.61 Moreover, if leakage of methane, a potent greenhouse gas, is not 
controlled, the climate change impact of a transition to natural gas is less positive.62 
Debates also occur over whether nuclear energy, despite its low-carbon footprint, 
should be considered clean due to the risks associated with it and issues around 
storing the waste produced by it.63 
These issues become even more complex in the context of trying to raise the 
percentage of renewables in energy markets because of intermittency—the wind does 
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not always blow and the sun does not always shine.64 While this issue could 
potentially be addressed fully through energy storage, that technology is not yet 
there.65 Many have argued for the pairing of renewables and natural gas in electricity 
production, with natural gas replacing the baseload function of coal (though some 
argue only on a transitional basis until energy storage can serve in that role).66 At the 
same time, numerous environmental advocates object to the characterization of 
natural gas as “clean” because it is a fossil fuel.67 
Although these disputes frame the context for this Article’s energy reinvestment 
analysis, the Article’s approach does not rely on a particular interpretation of “clean” 
energy to be effective. Its focus is on the corporate and financial legal mechanisms 
that exist to spur transition, with an underlying assumption that reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions and other environmental externalities should be the goal of 
reinvestment.  
II. EFFORTS TO SPUR ENERGY TRANSITION THROUGH INVESTOR AND CORPORATE 
LEGAL OBLIGATIONS  
This Part explores the potential, and limitations, of an evolving set of legal tools 
under corporate and securities law to drive energy reinvestment by companies and 
large-scale investors. “Energy reinvestment” in this sense includes both efforts to 
enhance internal reallocation of assets by private sector entities (asset reinvestment) 
and shifting capital away from fossil fuels by external investors (capital 
reinvestment). The latter has been the focus of the energy divestment movement, 
which has sought to create public pressure on businesses to shift investments and 
assets out of fossil fuels.  
The evolution of this movement has been paralleled by an increasing focus on the 
possibilities for using established corporate and securities law mechanisms to 
encourage both internal and external divestment and reinvestment. Tools in this 
category include business risk disclosure requirements, shareholder proposals, and 
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actions to enforce the fiduciary duties of company directors. These tools are currently 
being tested and deployed by a range of public and private actors in the United States 
and also in comparable common law jurisdictions such as Australia and the United 
Kingdom.68 Analysis of early experience using these tools illustrates that they have 
limited, though varied, potential individually to influence business and investment 
decision-making. Generally, they are constrained by the prevailing emphasis on 
short-term profit maximization, rather than long-term risk management, within 
commercial practice.  
A. Divestment Movement 
In September 2014, as world leaders gathered in New York for the United Nations 
Climate Summit, the heirs to the fabled Rockefeller oil fortune announced that the 
Rockefeller Foundation would be withdrawing its funds from fossil fuel investments 
due to climate change concerns.69 The Rockefeller Brothers Fund controls around 
$860 million in assets, with seven percent invested, at the time, in fossil fuels.70 It 
justified this action to divest from fossil fuel assets as both a “moral imperative to 
preserve a healthy planet”71 and an economically sound investment strategy at a time 
of growing uncertainty about the future of fossil fuels such as coal. As Fund 
President, Stephen Heintz, described it: “The action we’re taking is symbolism, but 
it is important symbolism. We’re making a moral case, but also, increasingly, an 
economic case.”72 
The Rockefellers’ action is part of a wider global movement that has taken shape 
in recent years calling on major investors to withdraw their funds from fossil fuel 
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investments, particularly coal.73 The divestment movement consists of a loose 
coalition of nongovernmental organizations, religious groups, local governments, 
student organizations, institutional investors, and investor groups who stress the 
ethical, environmental, and financial risks associated with fossil fuel investments in 
an increasingly carbon-constrained world.74 This movement has been fostered by 
growing attention to and interest in the role that large investors and asset owners 
might play in influencing corporate behavior and regulation to better address climate 
change.75  
The movement’s advocacy and legal strategies represent a significant departure 
from traditional environmental campaigning on climate change, which has generally 
sought to force regulatory action by governments.76 The divestment movement 
focuses on generating public pressure for investors to divest from fossil fuels, but it 
also often works in tandem with broader corporate law efforts to shift the behavior 
of the corporate and financial sector on climate change. These efforts, discussed 
further below, include improving companies’ disclosure of their climate risk 
management processes, encouraging greater transparency by companies and 
investors about the extent of their fossil fuel holdings, and (potentially) taking action 
to enforce legal duties of directors or pension fund trustees to require them to take 
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financial risks associated with climate change into account in their business and 
investment practices. 
At face value, the divestment movement—and associated campaigns to improve 
corporate and investor disclosure of climate risk and internal action on energy 
transition—would seem to have enormous potential to shape the course of future 
climate change regulation. The core strategy seeks to harness companies’ and 
investors’ focus on financial risks and benefits (in addition to ethical considerations) 
to push for a move away from fossil fuel assets to greater investment in renewables 
and other cleaner energy sources.77 The movement has garnered some high-profile 
successes—such as the divestment decision by the Rockefeller Fund and the 
Norwegian $890 billion government pension fund’s commitment to sell off many of 
its coal-related investments78—and is increasingly noted for its rapid expansion 
compared to historical corporate divestment campaigns.79 Nonetheless, its broader 
contribution to climate change regulation and energy transition remains unclear.  
There are a number of important limitations and critiques raised in relation to 
fossil fuel divestment.80 For example, the divestment movement is often seen as 
placing too much emphasis on removing funds from fossil fuels and too little on 
where these funds are reinvested. High profile critics, such as Microsoft’s Bill 
Gates—whose charitable foundation has invested heavily in developing clean energy 
technologies—stress the need for the movement to think more broadly, with greater 
emphasis on reinvesting in clean energy: 
If you think divestment alone is a solution, I worry you’re taking 
whatever desire people have to solve this problem and kind of using up 
their idealism and energy on something that won’t emit less carbon 
—because only a few people in society are the owners of the equity of 
coal or oil companies. As long as there’s no carbon tax and that stuff is 
legal, everybody should be able to drive around. So I’ve been saying, 
“Hey, come on—broaden your message to be pro–R&D.” And even the 
same people who are divesting those stocks of energy companies, ideally 
some of that money would come into this pool that is funding these high-
risk innovations.81  
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It is also unclear how much economic effect even widespread divestment would 
have on companies invested in fossil fuels. The primary concern is that so long as 
plenty of investors remain who do not care that their money will be used in a way 
that exacerbates climate change, even the most polluting companies will still be able 
to raise funds if those investments remain economically profitable. In addition, any 
divested stocks will be quickly purchased by less ethically concerned investors.82 For 
instance, analysis of one of the most prominent shareholder and legislative boycotts 
involving considerable divestment—the U.S. boycott of South Africa’s apartheid 
regime in the 1980s and early 1990s83—suggests that the campaign had “little 
discernible effect either on the valuation of banks and corporations with South 
African operations or on the South African financial markets.”84 The cost of capital 
for South African firms and the government did increase somewhat in the 1980s, but 
a drop in the price of gold (a major export) may have played a bigger role.85 The 
Israel divestment movement of the past decade also does not seem to have raised the 
cost of capital for Israeli firms at all.86 
The divestment movement occurs in the broader context of a range of legal efforts 
to push companies to consider carbon risks, which are the focus of the sections that 
follow in this Part. In that context, divestment may help to provide both public 
pressure and a sense of major leaders’ commitment to these issues that are important 
to the overall energy transition reinvestment effort. Even without a direct economic 
                                                                                                                 
 
 82. Julie Ayling & Neil Gunningham, Non-State Governance and Climate Policy: The 
Fossil Fuel Divestment Movement, 17 CLIMATE POL’Y 131, 141 (2015). 
 83. There is limited empirical analysis available and these comments rely on findings 
from a small number of studies only, which present somewhat equivocal assessments of the 
impacts of divestment in South Africa on firm value. See Abagail McWilliams, Donald S. 
Siegel & Patrick M. Wright, Corporate Social Responsibility: Strategic Implications, 43 J. 
MGMT. STUD. 1, 11–12 (2006). 
 84. A good example of this assessment, which presents empirical evidence to counter the 
strong public and media rhetoric surrounding the power of divestment is: Siew Hong Teoh, 
Ivo Welch & C. Paul Wazzan, The Effect of Socially Activist Investment Policies on the 
Financial Markets: Evidence from the South African Boycott, 72 J. BUS. 35, 35 (1999). In this 
article, the authors document the size of U.S. corporate involvement in South Africa and 
examine the impact on prices and institutional shareholdings of the voluntary divestment 
decisions of U.S. firms with South African operations. Investments by public firms in South 
Africa were found to be small, as were price reactions to the announcement of pressure and 
divestitures. “Therefore, potential lost economic opportunities through the boycott were too 
small to be statistically or economically significant.” Id. at 38. The authors note that the 
demand for stocks is driven by many investors, from many countries, with many different 
preferences, meaning that divestment from large firms or entire sectors by even a large number 
of U.S. institutions made very little difference to stock values. They conclude that “the 
evidence indicates that it is unlikely that political shareholder activism has large wealth 
consequences.” Id. at 39. For an alternative assessment, see Peter Wright & Stephen P. Ferris, 
Agency Conflict and Corporate Strategy: The Effect of Divestment on Corporate Value, 18 
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 77, 77–83 (1997).  
 85. Fight the Power, ECONOMIST (June 25, 2015), https://www.economist.com/news 
/finance-and-economics/21656204-investors-are-being-pressed-sell-their-holdings-coal-oil-
and-gas-fight [https://perma.cc/P9FR-DCXN].  
 86. Id. 
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impact on targeted fossil fuel companies in the short term, high-profile divestment 
by investors can play an important role in discrediting and stigmatizing companies 
and industries, and in building pressure on governments and industry to hasten the 
shift to clean energy technology.87 
Importantly, however, the divestment movement also faces a number of legal 
obstacles. Many institutional investors, such as universities and charities that are 
facing the most pressure to divest, may arguably have a legal duty to get the highest 
risk-adjusted financial return possible on their portfolios. If divesting produces lower 
returns, that could lead to legal challenges. Insofar as major classes of institutional 
investors face legal limits on their discretion to divest, that could be a significant 
obstacle to the success of the movement. This Section considers three important 
classes of investors—nonprofit organizations, pension funds, and mutual funds—to 
explore this issue.  
1. Nonprofit Organizations 
A major target of the divestment movement has been universities, which are 
largely nonprofit organizations.88 Nonprofits are typically organized either as 
nonprofit corporations or as trusts.89 They are governed by state statutes, much like 
for-profit corporations.90 However, the ABA’s Model Nonprofit Corporation Act91 
has been influential and widely adopted.  
Nonprofit corporations are managed by their boards of directors and officers, as 
in ordinary corporations. Trusts are a creation of common law and managed by 
trustees; the standard reference work, with considerable persuasive authority for 
courts, is the Restatement (Third) of Trusts.92 That law has now been codified in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 87. Indeed, the divestment movement itself acknowledges that divestment is unlikely to 
have any short-term effect on the valuation of fossil fuel companies and posits the strategy as 
moral and political rather than economic. As Gunningham writes,  
[T]hese matters, however, are of little concern to the movement because it views 
pressuring vulnerable institutional investors as primarily a vehicle through which 
to achieve its main goal(s): . . . raising awareness of the climate change crisis and 
of the role played by fossil fuel extracting companies in precipitating it, and 
labeling these companies as morally reprehensible . . . to bring about a value shift 
not just among institutional investors but also, and more importantly, within the 
wider public and, by so doing, to precipitate effective action by nation states. 
Gunningham, supra note 73, at 311; see also ANSAR ET AL., supra note 73, at 34–36. 
 88. For an outstanding analysis of the legality of socially responsible investment by 
nonprofits, see Susan N. Gary, Is It Prudent to Be Responsible? The Legal Rules for Charities 
that Engage in Socially Responsible Investing and Mission Investing, 6 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 
106 (2011). 
 89. MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND 
STATE LAW AND REGULATION 116–17 (2004). 
 90. See id. at 133–73. 
 91. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2008). On adoption by states, see 
Michael E. Malamut, Summary of Sources of State Nonprofit Corporation Laws, National 
Parlimentarian, 2d Quarter, 2008, http://www.michaelmalamut.com/articles/2008q2_-
_sources_of_nonprofit_laws.pdf [https://perma.cc/KGC6-Z2JT]. 
 92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (AM. LAW INST. 2018). 
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many states, and so this Section treats the Uniform Trust Code93 as a typical 
statement of that law.  
The directors and officers of nonprofit corporations and the trustees of trusts are 
subject to the duty of loyalty.94 This means that they must make decisions in the sole 
interests of the beneficiaries of the corporation or trust. When nonprofit charities 
invest their endowments, their directors or trustees must make decisions about how 
to invest those funds. Those investment decisions are subject to the duty of loyalty. 
Traditionally, in the investment context, that duty has been understood to require 
consideration of only risk-adjusted financial returns.95 More recently, some 
commentators argue that fiduciaries may take into account the nonfinancial interests 
of their beneficiaries or the stated social goals of a charity in determining the 
organization’s best interests when investing.96 Though courts have given little 
guidance, some official commentary supports this position.97  
Nonprofits are also subject to the duty of care, requiring them to make prudent 
decisions.98 Beyond the general provisions of their organizational statutes and the 
common law, when it comes to investment decisions, charities are subject to several 
specific statutes governing prudent investment. The Uniform Prudent Investor Act 
(UPIA) applies to trusts, while the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act 
(UMIFA) and the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act 
(UPMIFA) apply to nonprofit corporations.99 The acts all require fiduciaries to act 
with the care of an ordinarily prudent person under similar circumstances. In doing 
so, they may consider the charitable purposes of the trust or corporation, including 
nonfinancial preferences of beneficiaries.100 
Thus, the various statutory and common law rules that apply to the fiduciaries of 
nonprofit corporations and charitable trusts do allow them to take into account 
nonfinancial interests when making investment decisions. However, they may do so 
only to the extent they are related to the interests of the organization’s beneficiaries 
or purposes. For some nonprofits, their purposes may be clearly related to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 93. UNIF. TRUST CODE (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). On adoption by states, see Acts, UNIF. 
LAW COMM., http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Trust%20Code [https://perma.cc 
/8EJM-B5ET]. 
 94. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2008); UNIF. TRUST CODE 
§ 802(a) (UNIF. LAW COMMISSION 2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(1) (AM. LAW 
INST. 2018). 
 95. Gary, supra note 88, at 114; John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Social Investing 
and the Law of Trusts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 72, 96 (1980). 
 96. Gary, supra note 88, at 115. 
 97. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2018) (“[S]ocial 
considerations may be taken into account in investing the funds of charitable trusts to the 
extent the charitable purposes would justify an expenditure of trust funds for the social issue 
or cause in question or to the extent the investment decision can be justified on grounds of 
advancing, financially or operationally, a charitable activity conducted by the trust.”) 
 98. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 89, at 187–95, 199–215. 
 99. Gary, supra note 88, at 117–19. 
 100. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(a), (c) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1994); UNIF. PRUDENT 
MGMT. INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 3(a), (e) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2006). For more detailed 
analysis, see Gary, supra note 88, at 118–19. Gary was the Reporter for the UPMIFA. 
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environmental or sustainability goals,101 allowing them to consider whether a target 
investment helps or hinders energy transition even where doing so might decrease 
expected financial returns. For others, the connection to purpose may be harder to 
make. Is there any relationship between combating climate change and the 
educational purpose of a university, for example? 
Of course, even if there is no plausible connection to charitable purpose, nonprofit 
fiduciaries may consider climate change effects to the extent that they reasonably 
believe those may affect the financial returns and risks of an investment. Those 
effects are disputed. The academic literature is rather extensive. Some studies find a 
positive financial return for various forms of socially responsible investing, including 
strategies focused on sustainability and environmental concerns, some find negative 
financial returns, and some find no statistically significant effect. Most studies do not 
show a clear negative effect, which should be helpful for investment managers trying 
to defend the use of social indicators.102 
It matters, then, how closely courts and other regulators may scrutinize the 
reasonableness of financial decisions. Traditionally, those decisions have not 
received the extreme deference that corporate managers receive under the business 
judgment rule. The UPIA, UMIFA, and UPMIFA state tort-like negligence 
standards, apply professional investment manager expertise expectations, and give a 
fairly detailed structure for evaluating investment prudence.103 However, that 
structure is based on modern portfolio theory, emphasizing risk and diversification 
and looking at the portfolio as a whole. There should be room to justify concern with 
climate change effects, as long as financial analysis shows genuine risk. 
In addition to these state law duty constraints, there are also federal tax 
considerations for private foundations.104 Both private foundations and their 
managers are subject to excise taxes on the amount of investments that jeopardize 
their charitable purpose.105 An investment jeopardizes charitable purpose if its 
expected return is overly low relative to the risks it poses. IRS regulation defines 
jeopardizing investments in terms of “ordinary business care and prudence,”106 
similar to the fiduciary duty standard. It is not very precise. In some ways, the tax 
rules may be of more concern to affected foundations than the state law fiduciary 
duties. In many cases, there may be no disinterested private party with standing (and 
incentive) to sue to discipline a violation of the fiduciary rule. State Attorneys 
General may enforce, but in most states, they do not have the staffing or interest to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 101. See, e.g., ENVTL. DEF. FUND, https://www.edf.org/ [https://perma.cc/DT5J-46WW]; 
NATURE CONSERVANCY, https://www.nature.org/ https://perma.cc/8LS3-E8UQ].  
 102. For a recent meta-analysis of fifty-three empirical studies, see Miriam von Wallis & 
Christian Klein, Ethical Requirement and Financial Interest: A Literature Review on Socially 
Responsible Investing, 8 BUS. RES. 61 (2015). Von Wallis and Klein also reference and briefly 
discuss earlier meta-studies and literature reviews. See id. at 71. 
 103. See Gary, supra note 88, at 117–21. 
 104. A subset of organizations among the broader universe of nonprofits that are exempt 
from income taxation. 
 105. I.R.C. § 4944 (2012). 
 106. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1(a)(2) (1972). 
2019] ENERGY RE-INVESTMENT  617 
 
do so (until a violation receives enough publicity, at any rate).107 The tax rules, in 
contrast, are enforced by the IRS, which regularly gathers financial data.  
Ultimately, it is not clear that the chances of attracting the IRS’s attention for 
jeopardizing investments or the State Attorney General’s attention for potential state 
fiduciary law violations are very high outside the most extreme of cases, but even 
small risks may discourage those who manage the endowments of private 
foundations, especially since the managers themselves are subject to an excise tax. 
Divesting from established fossil fuel companies is probably less legally risky 
than investing in start-up renewable energy companies. Energy companies are 
significant but still overall a quite modest part of the total market capitalization of 
publicly-traded U.S. corporations.108 Divesting from this one sector leaves 
investment managers with most of the market still available as a place to put their 
funds. By contrast, investing in risky start-up clean energy companies (a strategy that 
is the focus of Part III) poses more visible risk of losing money on a specific 
investment. The IRS could well notice that. Knowing this, investment managers may 
well shy away from such investments if they see them as too financially risky. 
2. Pension Funds 
Another important type of institutional investor is pension funds.109 These are 
investment pools created to fund the retirement pensions of employees on defined 
benefit plans. Such plans pay out a specified amount of money, based on a 
contractual formula, to their retirees. Money must be set aside to ensure that enough 
will be available to make the promised payments.110 How much needs to be set aside, 
and how to invest that money until it is needed, are extremely complex questions. If 
those managing a fund make the wrong decisions, there will not be enough to pay 
what is required. 
At times, some of the fiduciaries who manage pension funds may be either 
incompetent or tempted to make overly optimistic assumptions about returns on 
investment, so that the employers (or unions) who created the funds need not set 
aside as much money. As a consequence, many pension funds have been 
underfunded.111 In response to this problem, the Employment Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) was passed.112  
                                                                                                                 
 
 107. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 89, at 305–11; see CINDY M. LOTT, ELIZABETH T. BORIS, 
KARIN KUNSTLER GOLDMAN, BELINDA J. JOHNS, MARCUS GADDY & MAURA FARRELL, URBAN 
INST., STATE REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT IN THE CHARITABLE SECTOR 18–24 (2016), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/84161/2000925-State-Regulation-and 
-Enforcement-in-the-Charitable-Sector.pdf [https://perma.cc/FLJ8-8C5A]. 
 108. Power Shift Network estimates that fossil fuel related companies represented about 
13% of U.S. stock market capitalization in 2013. Dan Apfel, Does My University Invest in 
Fossil Fuels?, POWER SHIFT NETWORK, http://powershift.org/campaigns/divest/campaigns.  
 109. See generally Henry H. Drummonds, The Aging of the Boomers and the Coming 
Crisis in America’s Changing Retirement and Elder Care Systems, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
267 (2007). 
 110. See id. at 276–81. 
 111. See id. 
 112. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 
618 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 94:595 
 
ERISA imposes a number of strict, detailed rules on the plans that it covers.113 
Among these are strict fiduciary duty rules, including the duties of loyalty and care, 
both in general and with specific rules on prohibited conflict of interest transactions 
and on diversification and other principles of prudent investing.114 ERISA says that 
in carrying out these duties, fiduciaries must act “for the exclusive purpose of 
providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and defraying reasonable 
expenses of the plan . . . .”115 
That “exclusive purpose” language raises obvious obstacles to ERISA 
beneficiaries taking nonfinancial concerns into account. As always, to the extent that 
energy transition issues pose genuine concerns about future financial returns, 
fiduciaries can take those concerns into account. But can they go beyond that? 
The Department of Labor, which administers ERISA, has issued guidance on this 
point in several interpretive bulletins. That guidance provides only limited flexibility 
for considering the social effects of investments. The Department first addressed this 
issue in 1994 in Interpretive Bulletin 94–1,116 then again in 2008 in Interpretive 
Bulletin 2008–1,117 once again in 2015 in Interpretive Bulletin 2015–01,118 and most 
recently in Field Assistance Bulletin No. 2018–01.119 
All four bulletins agree on basic principles. Above all, “the focus of plan 
fiduciaries on the plan’s financial returns and risk to beneficiaries must be 
paramount.”120 Fiduciaries cannot accept below market returns or above market risks 
                                                                                                                 
 
Stat. 829 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2012)). 
 113. Pension funds established by government entities and churches are not covered. 
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of 1974 (ERISA), 59 Fed. Reg. 32,606 (June 23, 1994) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509). 
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Fed. Reg. 61734 (Oct. 17, 2008) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509). 
 118. See Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Fiduciary Standard Under ERISA in 
Considering Economically Targeted Investments, 80 Fed. Reg. 65,135 (Oct. 26, 2015) 
(codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509).  
 119. See Memorandum from John J. Canary, Dir. of Regulations & Interpretations, Dep’t 
of Labor, to Mabel Capolongo, Dir. of Enf’t, Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin. (Apr. 23, 2018), 
[hereinafter Field Assistance Bulletin No. 2018–01], https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa 
/employers-and-advisers/guidance/field-assistance-bulletins/2018-01 [https://perma.cc/85AC 
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 120. Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Fiduciary Standard Under ERISA in Considering 
Economically Targeted Investments, 80 Fed. Reg. at 63135. 
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in order to achieve social or environmental goals. They can, however, take such 
nonfinancial goals as tiebreakers in choosing among investments that are equally 
good from a financial point of view.121 The four bulletins differ somewhat in their 
exact rhetoric, guidance, and discussion of procedures. The 2015 bulletin argues that 
the 2008 bulletin was overly discouraging, treating appropriate use of social and 
environmental concerns as something that should be quite rare. The 2015 bulletin 
emphasizes that social and environmental concerns may quite well be relevant to 
considering future financial returns and are also appropriate as tiebreakers. It tells 
fiduciaries that they may appropriately consider and use metrics of social and 
environmental performance, while still acknowledging that financial return must 
remain paramount.122 
Predictably, following another change in administration and political party, the 
most recent 2018 bulletin once again takes a more constricting approach to the extent 
to which fiduciaries can consider social policy goals.  
Fiduciaries must not too readily treat ESG factors as economically 
relevant to the particular investment choices at issue when making a 
decision. It does not ineluctably follow from the fact that an investment 
promotes ESG factors, or that it arguably promotes positive general 
market trends or industry growth, that the investment is a prudent choice 
for retirement or other investors. Rather, ERISA fiduciaries must always 
put first the economic interests of the plan in providing retirement 
benefits.123 
As a result of this guidance, plans subject to ERISA can consider the 
environmental and social impact of their investments, and in particular the effects on 
energy transition. However, they must be quite careful how they do so, and 
consequently they would appear quite unlikely to become leaders of the divestment 
movement, or aggressive players in it. 
3. Mutual Funds 
Investment advisers of mutual funds are an additional important category of 
investment fiduciary. Mutual funds own a large fraction of the shares and bonds of 
publicly-traded companies.124 In addition to being governed by state fiduciary duty 
law, based on the type of business association they choose to be and the state in which 
they register, they are subject to extensive federal securities regulation under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940.125 There is a provision giving the SEC the ability 
to sue to enforce violations of fiduciary duty,126 as well as a prohibition of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 121. Id. at 65136. 
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transactions with various sorts of affiliated persons, which aims at conflicts of 
interests.127 
The proscription against transactions with affiliates is strictly enforced, but the 
duty provision is much less so. Occasionally, excessive compensation to investment 
advisers is struck down, but not often.128 Fiduciary duties are generally not used to 
police the prudence of investment decisions where advisers have no financial conflict 
of interest. Rather, the focus of the 1940 Act, like U.S. securities regulation generally, 
is on disclosure. Funds must disclose in detail the nature of their investment 
strategies.129 Failure to follow their stated strategy may lead to a suit claiming 
securities fraud, and the ability to change strategies is limited.130 But as long as funds 
state in their strategies that they will consider, in specified ways, whatever 
environmental and social concerns they wish, and act in accordance with their stated 
strategies, they may do so, as evidenced by the fact that funds that explicitly follow 
socially responsible investment strategies are now a significant part of the mutual 
fund industry.131 
Thus, ERISA fiduciaries are the most constrained, nonprofits are significantly 
constrained but less than ERISA fiduciaries (especially insofar as the environmental 
and social goals at stake are related to the charitable purposes of a particular 
nonprofit), and mutual fund managers are the least constrained, as long as they 
disclose the strategies they are following. Even those most legally constrained to 
focus only on financial returns will still have a quite plausible argument that given 
the risks surrounding climate change, divesting from companies invested heavily in 
fossil fuels is defensible as an investment strategy in the long run. Although the legal 
obstacles exist, especially for some categories of investors, many investors should be 
able to divest if they so choose (and a number of them seem to be making that choice).  
The bigger issue, as noted above, is the ability of that movement to raise the cost 
of capital for targeted companies. However, divestment’s role in shifting social 
norms may pair well with other strategies discussed in this Article to advance energy 
transition. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 127. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (2012). 
 128. See, e.g., Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., 559 U.S. 335 (2010). 
 129. The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry: Investment Company Act of 1940, U.S. 
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B. Corporate Disclosure of Climate Risk 
The corporate reporting and disclosure requirements under federal securities law 
require listed companies to disclose information that presents a true and fair 
representation of their financial position to the market, via periodic reporting and in 
other communications such as offer documents (e.g. prospectuses, fundraising, and 
takeover documents) and investor briefings.132 Corporate disclosures provide 
information that enables market participants (such as investors, creditors, insurers, 
customers, and suppliers) to make an informed assessment about the risks and 
opportunities faced by a particular company. With increasing recognition of the 
business risks posed by climate change across all sectors of the economy,133 these 
disclosure requirements offer an indirect tool to provide information to influence the 
decision-making of these market participants and companies themselves in favor of 
energy divestment or reinvestment.  
The business risks posed by climate change are complex and numerous, and their 
materiality will differ significantly depending on the nature of the business, its size 
and level of diversification as well as the timeframes adopted for consideration of 
climate risks. Climate risks are now commonly classified as physical risks or 
nonphysical/transition risks.134 Physical risks arise as a result of the impacts of 
climate change (e.g., extreme weather events, changed water availability, and sea 
level rise) on company assets, operations, and supply chains.135 Nonphysical (or 
transition) risks refer to a range of legal, technological, market, and reputational 
risks.136 For example, new laws and policies introduced to address climate change, 
will potentially lead to compliance costs and liabilities, restrictions on the use of 
carbon-intensive assets, and asset stranding. Changing market conditions and 
technological developments (such as the rise of battery storage and other 
decentralized energy technologies) will further threaten the business models of 
carbon-intensive industries, such as traditional energy generators and utilities. 
Litigation brought against companies by both private and public parties (e.g., claims 
seeking to establish liability for carbon emissions or climate change impacts,137 or 
                                                                                                                 
 
 132. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. 73–291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified 
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Case No. CIV1702586 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed July 17, 2017). For an update on the progress of 
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claims arising from failures to disclose climate risks or take them into account in 
decision-making138) may also impact a company’s earnings and liabilities as well as 
a company’s reputation and social license to operate.139 
Corporate disclosure of climate risk can potentially drive or support divestment 
and reinvestment decisions in three ways. First, reporting climate-related risks is 
thought to focus a company’s attention internally on developing risk management 
strategies (which may include divesting carbon-intensive assets) and harnessing 
associated market opportunities (such as accelerating investments in technological 
innovation and clean energy).140 Second, climate risk disclosure provides 
information to investors and other market participants, who are increasingly seeking 
targeted, decision-ready information to support longer term investment decisions and 
address concerns about the climate risk exposure of their portfolios.141 Third, full and 
timely risk disclosure is regarded as crucial to market transparency and efficiency, 
and can help to maintain economic stability and resilience.142 Mainstream 
international financial institutions are increasingly cautious about the risks posed to 
global financial stability by climate change, particularly where abrupt transitions take 
place.143 These institutions have been strong supporters of a well-managed, gradual 
                                                                                                                 
 
these cases, see Rob Jordan, Stanford Law and Science Experts Discuss Court Case That 
Could Set Precedent for Climate Change Litigation, STANFORD (Mar. 30, 2018), https:// 
news.stanford.edu/2018/03/30/case-questions-climate-change-culpability [https://perma.cc 
/RVM4-65JT]. 
 138. See further discussion below of regulatory investigations of alleged security fraud and 
related private claims brought against fossil fuel companies such as ExxonMobil. 
 139. MINTER ELLISON & 2 DEGREES INVESTING INITIATIVE, THE CARBON BOOMERANG: 
LITIGATION AS A DRIVER AND A CONSEQUENCE OF THE ENERGY TRANSITION 6 (2017); 
TASKFORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES (TCFD), RECOMMENDATIONS OF 
THE TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES 8 (2016); Peter Seley & 
Richard Dudley, Emerging Trends in Climate Change Litigation, LAW360 (Mar. 7, 2016), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/766214/emerging-trends-in-climate-change-litigation 
[https://perma.cc/PE89-PHZN].  
 140. See Jane Andrew & Corinne L. Cortese, Carbon Disclosures: Comparability, the 
Carbon Disclosure Project and the Greenhouse Gas Protocol, 5 AUSTRALASIAN ACCT., BUS. 
AND FIN. J., no. 4, 2011, at 5; Nigel Topping, Carbon Disclosure Project, How Does 
Sustainability Disclosure Drive Behavior Change?, 24 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. (2012). 
 141. TCFD, supra note 139, at 3.  
 142. TCFD, supra note 139, at 8; Mark Carney, Governor, Bank of Eng., Chairman, Fin. 
Stability Bd., Speech at Lloyd’s of London: Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon – Climate 
Change and Financial Stability (Sept. 29, 2015), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-
/media/boe/files/speech/2015/breaking-the-tragedy-of-the-horizon-climate-change-and 
-financial-stability.pdf?la=en&hash=7C67E785651862457D99511147C7424FF5EA0C1A 
[https://perma.cc/5T8Z-BFMC]. 
 143. This is well illustrated by the establishment of the Taskforce on Climate-related 
Financial Disclosures by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) of the G20 in 2015. The FSB is 
an international body that monitors and makes recommendations about the global financial 
system. Its mandate is to promote international financial stability by coordinating national 
financial authorities and international standard-setting bodies as they work toward developing 
strong regulatory, supervisory, and other financial sector policies. About the FSB, FINANCIAL 
STABILITY BOARD, http://www.fsb.org/about [https://perma.cc/DD6D-BTJR]. 
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transition to a clean energy economy, supported by effective and consistent 
disclosure of financial risks associated with climate change. 
Federal securities law requires all listed companies to file quarterly reports with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) detailing their financial position and 
identifying any material risks facing their business.144 In 2010, the SEC issued 
specific guidance on how these disclosure requirements applied to climate change 
matters.145 The SEC guidance highlighted the particular rules likely to trigger 
requirements to disclose climate risks146 and provided a range of examples of climate 
change-related issues that may require consideration.147 These examples span both 
physical and nonphysical transition risks, with the latter including the need to comply 
with changing climate regulatory requirements, the indirect effects of those 
requirements, and business trends that include declining demand for carbon intensive 
products.148  
Immediately following the issuance of SEC guidance, corporate disclosure of 
climate risks in quarterly reports increased significantly.149 Subsequently, however, 
concerns have been raised about the quality and impact of this disclosure. Although 
more companies mentioned climate change in their reports, their actual disclosures 
were often brief and lacking in substance. 150 An analysis of 2014 financial filings by 
top U.S. listed companies found that “27% of companies identified no material 
climate risk at all. Of the approximately 70% that did, only 15% used metrics, and 
approximately 40% used boilerplate language—broad, nonspecific wording that 
does not describe the realities of the reporter’s particular operating context.”151 
Climate risk disclosure by fossil fuel companies has been particularly scrutinized. 
For example, an analysis of disclosures made by ten of the world’s largest publicly 
traded oil and gas companies found them to be “generally inadequate to allow 
                                                                                                                 
 
 144. 17 C.F.R. § 229.601 (2002). Securities Act Rule 408 and Exchange Act Rule 12b-20 
also require a registrant to disclose, in addition to the information expressly required by 
Commission regulation, “such further material information, if any, as may be necessary to 
make the required statements, in light of the circumstances under which they are made, not 
misleading.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.408 (2018); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (2018). 
 145. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change Release, 
Exchange Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290 (Feb. 8, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 231, 
241).  
 146. Id.; see infra Sections III.A–E. 
 147. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change Release, 
Exchange Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290 (Feb. 8, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 231, 
241. 
 148. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change Release, 
Exchange Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290 (Feb. 8, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 231, 
241) 
 149. See JIM COBURN & JACKIE COOK, CERES, COOL RESPONSE: THE SEC & CORPORATE 
CLIMATE CHANGE REPORTING 11–12 (2014). 
 150. Id.; see also David Gelles, SEC is Criticised for Lax Enforcement of Climate Risk 
Disclosure, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/business/energy 
-environment/sec-is-criticized-for-lax-enforcement-of-climate-risk-disclosure.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/5A2G-CYDK]. 
 151. TCFD, supra note 139, at 17 (referring to data from the Sustainability Accounting 
Standards Board (SASB)). 
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investors to conduct complete and accurate assessments of risks and future 
performance.”152 According to the authors of this analysis, the companies 
investigated were making extensive capital investments related to climate change 
that carried material financial risks, but were generally failing to disclose them 
adequately consistent with SEC rules and growing investor expectations.153 
These outcomes suggest that, for many companies, corporate disclosure 
obligations are not necessarily supporting changed corporate decision-making, nor 
is the disclosure of climate risks within SEC filings of a sufficient quality to provide 
useful information to investors to drive divestment decisions. This has been partially 
attributed to inadequate compliance activity by the SEC: “[C]omment letters over 
the last four years show minimal attention by the SEC to climate risk as a disclosure 
issue and do not reveal an ongoing SEC commitment to implement the Guidance.”154  
However, prevailing regulatory and policy uncertainties in the United States, and 
more broadly, have undoubtedly also played a role—even during the Obama 
Administration’s extensive federal regulatory efforts. The business implications (and 
hence the materiality of associated business risks) of the Paris Agreement and the 
Trump Administration’s withdrawal from it remain unclear. While the Trump 
Administration has been rolling back many relevant areas of federal regulation, other 
nations continue to move forward, and many U.S. states are proceeding in line with 
the pledges that the Obama Administration made.155 Investment risks are likely to 
remain highly speculative unless significantly stronger domestic laws and policies 
are put in place that signal compliance costs and liabilities and the market responds 
definitively. 
In the absence of strong enforcement action by the SEC, there has been 
considerable agitation by public and private parties to test the extent of disclosure 
requirements and their capacity to drive change in corporate and investor decision-
making. In the United States, this has been led by state regulators who have 
considerable powers under state securities fraud statutes to investigate and sue 
companies for misleading or fraudulent behavior.156 
For example, in one of the first of these actions, the New York Attorney General 
investigated the SEC filings from 2011 to 2014 from Peabody Energy Corporation 
                                                                                                                 
 
 152. JIM COBURN, RYAN SALMON & DAVE GROSSMAN, SUSTAINABLE EXTRACTION?: AN 
ANALYSIS OF SEC DISCLOSURE BY MAJOR OIL & GAS COMPANIES ON CLIMATE RISK & 
DEEPWATER DRILLING RISK 2 (2012). 
 153. Id. at 1. 
 154. See COBURN & COOK, supra note 149, at 25; Gelles, supra note 150.  
 155. Thousands of mayors, governors, tribal leaders, CEOs, and university presidents have 
signed the “We Are Still In” declaration, signaling their enduring commitment to the Paris 
Agreement and the United States’ contribution to it. See WE ARE STILL IN 
https://www.wearestillin.com/signatories [https://perma.cc/YH28-QEXR].  
 156. The powers conferred on state regulators under these statutes coexist with the powers 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. For a discussion of the strong investigative powers and 
extensive penalties available under state-level laws, see Aaron A. Tidman, Securities Law 
Enforcement in the Twenty-First Century: Why States Are Better Equipped Than the Securities 
and Exchange Commission to Enforce Securities Law, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 379, 391 (2007). 
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(the world’s largest publicly traded coal company),157 found that these disclosures 
misled shareholders by understating the severe potential impacts of climate change 
risks to its business,158 and claimed an inability to predict the financial impacts of 
future climate policy laws or regulations.159 This investigation, brought under the 
New York Martin Act (one of the strongest state securities fraud statutes in terms of 
investigative powers and available penalties) was settled in November 2015.160 
While Peabody did not admit to fraudulent disclosure practices, the company did 
undertake to improve climate risk disclosure substantially.161  
Over the course of 2016, the New York Attorney General, along with many other 
U.S. state attorney generals, launched similar securities fraud investigations into the 
reporting practices of Exxon Mobil, alleging the company had misled the market by 
repeatedly and deliberately concealing the financial risks posed by climate change to 
its business.162 These investigations have focused particularly on Exxon’s actions in 
publicly promoting climate science skepticism and uncertainty while privately 
acknowledging the legitimacy of the science and the significant potential impacts of 
climate change on the Exxon business model.163 In September 2016, it was reported 
that the SEC had also begun investigating the disclosure practices of Exxon and its 
auditor Price Waterhouse Coopers, focusing particularly on the company’s practice 
of not writing down the values of its oil and gas reserves in the context of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 157. See Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Attorney Gen., A.G. Schneiderman 
Secures Unprecedented Agreement with Peabody Energy to End Misleading Statements and 
Disclose Risks Arising From Climate Change (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-
release/ag-schneiderman-secures-unprecedented-agreement-peabody-energy-end-misleading 
[https://perma.cc/V6KU-CKSB]. Prior to this investigation, the previous New York Attorney 
General conducted a number of investigations of other energy companies and pursued 
agreements with these companies to disclose the risks of climate change in SEC filings. See 
Ashley Poon, An Examination of New York’s Martin Act as a Tool To Combat Climate 
Change, 44 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 115, 131–32 (2017).  
 158. Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Attorney Gen., supra note 157. Specifically, 
the investigation focused on Peabody’s misrepresentation of future projects for coal markets 
under various regulatory and market scenarios used by the International Energy Agency in its 
energy forecasting. Id. 
 159. The investigation uncovered considerable evidence that Peabody had conducted 
internal investigations of potential business impacts of climate change and contracted 
consultants to carry out this analysis but claimed in their SEC filings that these impacts were 
impossible to predict. Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Attorney Gen., supra note 157. 
 160. The Martin Act, New York General Business Law article 23-A, sections 352–353, is 
a 1921 New York statute that gives extraordinary powers and discretion to an attorney general 
fighting financial fraud. See Poon, supra note 157.  
 161. See id. at 132. 
 162. See Justin Gillis & Clifford Krauss, ExxonMobil Investigated for Possible Climate 
Change Lies by New York Attorney General, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/06/science/exxon-mobil-under-investigation-in-new-york 
-over-climate-statements.html [https://perma.cc/X7GA-R6P9]; Ivan Penn, California to 
Investigate Whether Exxon Mobil Lied About Climate-Change Risks, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 20, 
2016, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-exxon-global-warming-20160120 
-story.html [https://perma.cc/C8CJ-CX8H].  
 163. For a fuller discussion of the New York investigation and corresponding actions in 
other states, see Poon, supra note 157. 
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escalating global response to climate change.164 These multiple investigations are 
ongoing.  
In the first private claim related to climate risk disclosure, a shareholder class 
action was commenced in November 2016 against Exxon on behalf of purchasers of 
Exxon stock during the class period (February–October 2016).165 The complaint 
alleges that throughout this period, Exxon repeatedly highlighted the strength of its 
business model and its transparency and reporting integrity, particularly with regard 
to its oil and gas reserves and the value of those reserves.166 The claimants argue that 
these public statements by the company were materially false and misleading 
because: they failed to disclose Exxon’s own internal reports concerning the nature 
and extent of climate change risks; given these risks, a material portion of Exxon’s 
reserves were stranded and should therefore be written down; and Exxon had used 
an inaccurate price on carbon to value certain of its future oil and gas prospects in 
order to keep the value of its reserves materially overstated.167 They alleged that as a 
result of these misleading statements, Exxon stock traded at artificially inflated 
prices.168 The claimants have alleged that they suffered a loss when the value of 
Exxon stocks fell substantially as a result of the above noted regulatory investigations 
into the company’s disclosure and accounting practices and subsequent 
announcements by Exxon that it might be forced to write down nearly 20% of its oil 
and gas assets.169 
These regulatory investigations and private claims have all targeted large, fossil 
fuel companies, often as part of a broader strategic litigation movement to support 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction and energy-transition campaigns. The parallels 
between the emerging litigation strategy being deployed against carbon majors and 
the litigation strategies used to tackle Big Tobacco have been increasingly noted:170 
coalitions of state regulators are working together to target corporations and 
deploying misleading and deceptive conduct avenues, which in turn may support 
other litigation streams.171 For example, the volumes of internal company 
information that have been made publicly available through the Exxon investigations 
are being used as the basis for other litigation, such as claims brought by Californian 
municipalities against carbon majors for loss and damages suffered as a result of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 164. Bradley Olson & Aruna Viswanatha, SEC Probes Exxon Over Accounting for Climate 
Change, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 20, 2016, 7:55 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec 
-investigating-exxon-on-valuing-of-assets-accounting-practices-1474393593 [https://perma 
.cc/A2YF-B67L]; Christine Wang, SEC Reportedly Investigating Exxon Mobil on Climate 
Change, Accounting Practices: Report, CNBC (Sept. 20, 2016, 6:16 PM), https://www.cnbc 
.com/2016/09/20/sec-investigating-exxon-mobil-on-climate-change-accounting-practices 
-report.html [https://perma.cc/77FH-LBFK]. 
 165. Complaint, Ramirez v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 3:16-cv-3111 (N.D. Tex. 2016), 
http://securities.stanford.edu/filings-documents/1059/EMC00_02/2016117_f01c 
_16CV03111.pdf [https://perma.cc/G3HU-EX64]. 
 166. Id., ¶¶ 3, 29–33. 
 167. Id., ¶¶ 3(a)–(c), 34–46. 
 168. Id., ¶¶ 4–7, 47–58. 
 169. Id., ¶¶ 62–68. 
 170. See, e.g., Ellison, supra note 139, at 29, 33, 35. 
 171. Poon, supra note 157, at 126. 
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climate change,172 as well as to undermine the company’s reputation and social 
license to operate.173 These securities fraud claims are also being replicated in other 
comparable common law jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom174 and 
Australia.175 While there have not yet been any formal outcomes in the form of court 
decisions and orders to crystallize their impact on corporate behavior, the significant 
intensification of litigation activity is an indication of growing pressure on 
companies to acknowledge and respond appropriately to risks associated with the 
energy transition.  
C. Shareholder Proposals 
Another legal avenue that has been increasingly used to influence company and 
investor decision-making to support energy divestment and reinvestment is bringing 
shareholder proposals to the general meeting of companies. Shareholder proposals 
are a formal, public avenue for shareholder activism,176 which can take a range of 
forms, including more behind-the-scenes negotiation and appeals to management.177 
                                                                                                                 
 
 172. Supra note 137. 
 173. Reputational risks are noted as a type of potentially material financial risk associated 
with climate change. See TCFD, supra note 133, at 24, tbl. 3b. 
 174. For example, ClientEarth, a leading environmental law NGO in the UK, submitted 
regulatory complaints to the UK Financial Reporting Council in 2016 alleging that two major 
oil and gas companies (SOCO International PLC and Cairn Energy PLC) failed to disclose 
climate-related risks to investors. The complaints argued that the annual reports of these 
companies did not provide a fair review of the company’s business; a proper account of the 
main trends and factors likely to affect the future development, performance, and position of 
the company’s business; nor a proper description of the principal risks and uncertainties facing 
the company, as required by governing legislation. See Companies Act 2006 § 414C(7)(a), §§ 
414C(2)(b), & 172 (UK). For further information, see CLIENTEARTH, INVESTOR BRIEFING: 
COMPLAINTS FILED AGAINST SOCO INTERNATIONAL PLC AND CAIRN ENERGY PLC (2016), 
https://www.documents.clientearth.org/library/download-info/investor-briefing-complaints 
-filed-against-soco-international-plc-and-cairn-energy-plc/ [https://perma.cc/623F-25JR]. 
 175. In August 2017, a shareholder of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (one of the 
four main banks in Australia) lodged a claim in the Federal Court alleging that the bank had 
failed to disclose the risks associated with climate change that may impact on lending and 
investment activities, strategies, and prospects in its 2016 Annual Report. See Abrahams v. 
Commonwealth Bank of Austl. [2017], FCA, VID 879/2017 (Austl.). As a consequence, the 
bank had allegedly failed to present a true and fair view of its position and prospects as 
required by governing law, see Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 292(1)(b), 295, 297, 298(1), 
298(1AA) (Austl). Id. For a discussion of this case, see Anita Foerster & Jacqueline Peel, 
Climate Change is a Financial Risk, According to a Lawsuit Against the CBA, CONVERSATION 
(Aug. 15, 2017, 4:14 PM), https://theconversation.com/climate-change-is-a 
-financial-risk-according-to-a-lawsuit-against-the-cba-82505 [https://perma.cc/RKA5-KC6J]. 
 176. Shareholder activism is broadly defined to refer to actions taken by shareholders with 
the intention of influencing the policy and practices of a corporation. For a comprehensive 
account of the development of shareholder activism in the United States and a 
multidisciplinary literature review of empirical work in the field, see Maria Goranova & Lori 
Verstegen Ryan, Shareholder Activism: A Multidisciplinary Review, 40 J. MGMT. 1230, 1232 
(2014). 
 177. Id. at 1247–48. Other public forms of activism may include questions put to the 
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This form of shareholder activism has a long history in the United States,178 with 
shareholders exercising their rights to put forward (usually) nonbinding resolutions 
as a strategy to engage with management and influence company policy and practice 
in a wide range of areas such as executive remuneration, labor rights and 
environmental responsibility.179 Over time, the types of parties bringing (or 
sponsoring) such resolutions has expanded from predominantly individual 
shareholders, charities, religious organizations and environmental groups to also 
include large-scale socially responsible investor platforms with considerable 
shareholdings and potential influence.180 
Shareholder proposals on climate change began emerging over twenty years 
ago,181 and have come to represent a significant proportion of the total proposals 
brought.182 Over time, climate change-related shareholder proposals have become 
                                                                                                                 
 
general meeting, publicized letters, and media campaigns; whereas private forms of activism 
may include behind-the-scenes consultations and negotiations, letters, phone calls, meetings, 
and ongoing dialogue. See also Jeanne M. Logsdon & Harry J. Van Buren III, Beyond the 
Proxy Vote: Dialogues Between Shareholders and Corporations, 87 J. BUS. ETHICS 353 
(2009). 
 178. Goranova and Ryan discuss the evolution of the shareholder activism landscape since 
1942 when shareholders were first granted the right to submit shareholder resolutions. Supra 
note 176, at 1233–34.  
 179. Shareholder activism tends to be viewed in two streams—(1) financial activism 
seeking to improve corporate governance and accountability and maximize shareholder value 
and (2) social activism which pursues various social, environmental, or political causes. In 
practice, there are often overlapping and complex drivers behind shareholder activism and 
climate change resolutions focusing on material financial risks are a good example of this. For 
a comprehensive account of the development of shareholder activism in the United States and 
a multidisciplinary literature review of empirical work in the field, see Goranova & Ryan, 
supra note 176, at 4, 12. For discussion of shareholder activism related to climate change, see 
Cynthia E. Clark & Elise Perrault Crawford, Influencing Climate Change Policy, 51 BUS. & 
SOC’Y 148, 152 (2012); J. Kevin Healy & Jeffrey M. Tapick, Climate Change: It’s Not Just a 
Policy Issue for Corporate Counsel – It’s a Legal Problem, 29 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 89 (2004); 
Erin M. Reid & Michael W. Toffel, Responding to Public and Private Politics: Corporate 
Disclosure of Climate Change Strategies, 30 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1157, 1160 (2009). 
 180. Goranova & Ryan, supra note 176, 1233, 1244–45; see also Michael Macleod & 
Jacob Park, Financial Activism and Global Climate Change: The Rise of Investor-Driven 
Governor Networks, 11 GLOBAL ENV’T POL. 54 (2011). 
 181. For example, the first climate change resolution was put to Exxon Mobil in 1997. 
Dashka Slater, Resolved: Public Corporations Shall Take us Seriously, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/12/magazine/12exxon-t.html?_r=0 [https://perma 
.cc/HMT7-WQ5A]. 
 182. For example, the Ceres’s Investor Network on Climate Risk (which includes some of 
the nation’s largest public pension funds, foundations and religious, labor and socially 
responsible investors and manages more than $23 trillion in collective assets) tracks 
shareholder resolutions filed by network members on sustainability-related issues including 
climate change. According to this data, 363 of a total of 781 resolutions filed by the Ceres’s 
Investor Network on Climate Risk on sustainability related issues in 2016 focused on climate 
change; 44 of these also related to carbon asset risk; and 200 also related to GHG emissions 
(with some overlap between these categories). See Climate and Sustainability Shareholder 
Resolution Database, CERES (MAR. 7, 2017), https://www.ceres.org/resources/tools/climate-
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increasingly sophisticated. Early resolutions focused on disclosing greenhouse gas 
emissions and energy use and reporting on how climate change policies may affect 
the company. More recent proposals urge companies to develop new business 
strategies that accord with global temperature goals to mitigate dangerous climate 
change (as agreed in the Paris Climate Accord) and report on their implementation, 
or to put a climate expert on the board.183 Recent resolutions have also requested 
companies to disclose direct and indirect lobbying activities and expenditures to 
allow shareholders to assess whether the company’s lobbying is consistent with its 
expressed goals and in the best interests of stockholders, often drawing particular 
attention to memberships in, or payments to, trade associations which may engage in 
lobbying activity that undermines the international climate regime and directly 
contradicts the stated company position on climate change.184 
Shareholder proposals are a form of engagement reliant on continuing 
shareholding in a company. While this tool may support internal asset divestment 
decisions by companies, it should be distinguished from decisions by shareholders 
                                                                                                                 
 
and-sustainability-shareholder-resolutions-database [https://perma.cc/2YHK-6PZX]. More 
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 183. For example, in the 2016 general meeting of Chevron Corporation, a resolution asking 
for an annual report each year on how climate-change policies will affect the company 
received 41% of the vote. A similar resolution brought to the meeting at Exxon Mobil received 
38%. The company's shareholders rejected resolutions to put a climate expert on the board and 
to support the goal of the 2015 Paris Agreement to limit global warming to two degrees Celsius 
above pre-industrial levels. See David Koenig, Exxon, Chevron Shareholders Reject Climate 
Resolutions, CLIMATE CHANGE DISPATCH (May 26, 2016), https://climatechangedispatch.com 
/exxon-chevron-shareholders-reject-climate-resolutions/ [https://perma.cc/7EJC-WFFW]. In 
2017, climate change resolutions brought to three major fossil fuel companies—Occidental 
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scenario analysis” to  
assess the impact on the company’s asset portfolio of long-term climate change, 
explaining (as stated in the Occidental proxy) “how capital planning and business 
strategies incorporate analyses of the short- and long-term financial risks of a 
lower carbon economy,” including specifically, “the impacts of multiple, 
fluctuating demand and price scenarios on the company’s existing reserves and 
resource portfolio.”  
Cydney Posner, Are Shareholder Proposals on Climate Change Becoming a Thing?, HARV. 
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 21, 2017), https://corpgov.law 
.harvard.edu/2017/06/21/are-shareholder-proposals-on-climate-change-becoming-a-thing/ 
[https://perma.cc/7ZBB-H3FD] (discussing these three resolutions). 
 184. See, for example, a proposal filed by a member of the Ceres’ Investor Network on 
Climate Risk to the general meeting of BlackRock Inc. concerning BlackRock’s membership 
and payments to various trade associations that undertake lobbying to undermine the Paris 
Climate Accord. The filers claim that the lack of trade association lobbying disclosure by 
BlackRock presents significant reputational risk because BlackRock itself believes climate 
change risk is an investment issue. Report on Lobbying (BLK, 2019 Resolution), CERES, 
https://engagements.ceres.org/ceres_engagementdetailpage?recID=a0l1H00000CFIqOQAX 
[https://perma.cc/4FKY-FJWQ]. 
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to divest outright of stocks in fossil fuel companies (capital divestment) and as such 
relinquish their ownership rights and restrict opportunities for continuing 
engagement. As noted earlier, there is an ongoing debate around the value of capital 
divestment versus engagement as a strategy to drive private sector uptake of clean 
energy practices, particularly in light of the concern that capital divestment may have 
limited or unintended economic impacts on the targeted firms and sectors.185 For 
example, capital divestment will rarely deprive companies of capital; instead it 
merely shifts asset owners away from shareholders who are concerned about climate 
change to those who are not concerned.186 As such, divestment strategies may have 
greater moral rather than economic value and play an important role in awareness 
raising and challenging the social license of polluting industries to operate rather than 
directly undermining the financial position of targeted firms. In this light, there are 
strong arguments in favor of adopting a strategy of engagement (via shareholder 
proposals and other tools) over capital divestment, particularly in relation to firms 
that are open to engaging with shareholders around the development of energy 
transition strategies in order to retain their investment.187 Further, as global 
investment managers BlackRock argue in a 2016 statement on adapting portfolios to 
climate change, large integrated companies will often have significant technical and 
resource capacity that could be deployed to develop and commercialize clean energy 
technology.188 For this reason, they favor engaging with these types of companies to 
influence company direction in this way rather than outright capital divestment.189 
The legal basis for shareholder proposals in the United States is found in federal 
securities regulations, which grant shareholders who own a relatively small amount 
of a company’s securities190 a right to put forward a nonbinding proposal as part of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 185. Richardson, supra note 77. 
 186. Ayling & Gunningham, supra note 82. 
 187. ERISA fiduciaries considering shareholder engagement over social policy issues such 
as climate change face legal constraints similar to those concerning their investment decisions. 
See supra notes 114–123 and accompanying text. Their focus must always remain on 
economic returns. A series of interpretive bulletins concerning proxy voting resembles the 
bulletins on investment decisions. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2 (2018); 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-2 
(2018); 29 C.F.R. § 2509.16-1 (2018); Field Assistance Bulletin No. 2018-01, supra note 119. 
The core principle remains that ERISA fiduciaries must focus on economic returns. They can 
incur modest costs in proxy voting and shareholder engagement to the extent that such voting 
and engagement can plausibly be seen to increase the value of their investments. The exact 
rhetoric of the guidance again varies, with bulletins issued during Democratic administrations 
rather more encouraging of engagement around social policy issues while bulletins issued 
during Republican administrations are less encouraging. 
 188. BLACKROCK INVESTMENT INSTITUTE, ADAPTING PORTFOLIOS TO CLIMATE CHANGE: 
IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIES FOR ALL INVESTORS (2016), https://www.blackrock 
.com/investing/literature/whitepaper/bii-climate-change-2016-us.pdf [https://perma.cc/3RA2 
-PPN8]. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Rule 14a-8 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that to be eligible to 
submit a proposal, a shareholder must own at least $2,000 in market value, or 1%, of a 
company’s outstanding stock for at least one year. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2018). They must 
continue to hold those shares through the meeting date and securities held must be entitled to 
be voted on the proposal at the meeting. Id. Changes to these parameters which would make 
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the proxy materials to be voted on at an annual or special meeting of shareholders.191 
A company will be required to include the proposal in the materials unless the 
shareholder fails to comply with procedural requirements or the proposal falls within 
one of the bases for exclusion provided in the rule.192 Grounds for exclusion are 
present where, inter alia, the subject matter of the proposal is not a proper subject 
for shareholder action under state law,193 the company would lack the power to 
implement the proposal,194 the proposal directly contravenes another proposal put 
forward by the company,195 or the proposal relates to a matter of the company’s 
ordinary business operations. 196 If a company decides to exclude a shareholder 
proposal from the proxy materials, it must submit a no-action request to the SEC 
explaining the reasons for this decision.197 The SEC must respond by either 
supporting or rejecting the company’s view in a no-action response.198  
For shareholders seeking to file proposals on environmental and climate change 
matters, the “ordinary business” exclusion has, in the past, been commonly raised by 
companies seeking to exclude a proposal through arguing that these resolutions 
concern matters that are properly the domain of company management, namely 
internal corporate assessments of general economic risks and policies.199 The SEC 
                                                                                                                 
 
it more difficult for activist shareholders to qualify to submit a proposal were outlined in the 
Financial Choice Act of 2017 which was passed by the House of Representatives on June 8, 
2017, and is now before the U.S. Senate. See H.R.10 – Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, 
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/10 [https://perma 
.cc/W2LF-RBTY]. These changes would remove the $2,000 limit and extend the minimum 
period of holding of 1% of capital from one year to three years as well as requiring that 
proposals be submitted directly by a shareholder (and not a proxy, representative, or agent). 
Id. 
 191. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14H (Oct. 22, 2015), https://www.sec.gov 
/interps/legal/cfslb14h.htm [https://perma.cc/TR8Y-JL7S], provides further information for 
companies and shareholders on Rule 14a-8 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  
 192. Id. at 2–3.  
 193. Rule 14a-8(i)(1) provides that a proposal may be excluded if the proposal is not a 
proper subject for action by shareholders under the laws of the jurisdiction of the company’s 
organization. State laws typically provide for all corporate powers to be exercised by or under 
the authority of the company board. This serves to potentially exclude proposals on matters 
that fall within the broad power of management. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1) (2018). 
 194. Rule 14a-8(i)(6) provides that a proposal may be excluded if he company would lack 
the power or authority to implement the proposal. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(6) (2018). 
 195. Rule 14a-8(i)(9) provides that a proposal may be excluded if the proposal directly 
conflicts with one of the company’s own proposals to be submitted to shareholders at the same 
meeting. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(9) (2018). 
 196. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7) (2018). 
 197. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin, supra note 191, at 4. 
 198. Id. at 8. The SEC states that no-action responses only reflect SEC’s informal views 
regarding the application of rule 14a-8. This is not a “ruling” or “decision” on proposals that 
companies indicate they intend to exclude, and any SEC determinations do not and cannot 
adjudicate the merits of a company’s position with respect to a proposal. As such, a no-action 
response in no way restricts shareholder rights to challenge a decision to exclude a proposal. 
 199. Matthew P. Allen, Eric M. Jamison & Mark J. Bennet, SEC Opens the Door for 
Climate Change-Related Shareholder Proposals and Disclosure Requirements, with Potential 
New Liabilities for Public Companies, 42 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1, 2 (2010).  
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advises that the rationale behind this exclusion is “to confine the resolution of 
ordinary business problems to management and the board of directors, since it is 
impracticable for shareholders to decide how to solve such problems at an annual 
shareholders meeting.”200 This is intended to exclude proposals that address matters 
which are thought to be fundamental to management’s ability to run a company (e.g. 
workforce management, decisions on production quality and quantity) or proposals 
seeking to “micro-manage” the company by seeking excessive detail or imposing 
unrealistic timeframes or methods for complex tasks.201 However, an important 
exception applies for proposals focusing on a significant policy issue because the 
proposals would “transcend the day-to-day business matters of a company and raise 
policy issues so significant that it would be appropriate for a shareholder vote.”202 As 
Matthew Allen, Eric Jamison, and Mark Bennet outlined in 2010, with the increase 
in greenhouse gas regulation and policy implications, climate change litigation trends 
and the SEC’s specific guidance on reporting climate-change-related business risks 
(discussed earlier), it became considerably more difficult to exclude resolutions on 
this basis as climate change was increasingly perceived as such a “significant policy 
issue” likely to pose material risks to a range of businesses.203 However, while 
companies may not be able formally to exclude a resolution on this basis, it is 
important to note that these are nonbinding or advisory resolutions. As such, it 
remains open to company management to oppose the resolution in the meeting and 
counter any shareholder request with information in the proxy materials, for 
example, outlining the company’s views and credentials on climate change.204 
There has been some empirical research tracking the outcomes of shareholder 
resolutions in terms of changed corporate policy and practice,205 however, to our 
knowledge, there have been no comprehensive studies that track the impact of 
climate-change-related resolutions specifically, especially over longer time frames. 
Drawing on the somewhat equivocal and context-specific evidence that has been 
collected on the outcomes of socially-motivated shareholder activism to date, a 
number of more general observations are made. First, most social and environmental 
issue proposals do not gain a majority vote and are lobbied against by Boards of 
Directors and Executive Management.206 Nonetheless, such resolutions may still 
have both direct effects on the company itself and spillover effects on other 
companies in the same industry. These effects are especially likely in circumstances 
where there is also public political pressure (e.g. threat of regulation) on the issue in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 200. Amendments to Rules of Shareholder Proposals Release No. 34-40018, 17 C.F.R. 240 
(May 21, 1998) https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-40018.htm [https://perma.cc/E3JT 
-4XW6].  
 201. Id. 
 202. Id.; see also SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14H, supra note 191; SEC Staff Legal 
Bulletin No. 14E (Oct. 27, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/2RUZ-JYW2]. 
 203. Allen et al., supra note 199, at 3.  
 204. Id.  
 205. See the outline of this body of research provided by Goranova & Ryan, supra note 
176, at 1250–59. 
 206. Reid & Toffel, supra note 179, at 1160.  
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question207 and activists are targeting large and highly visible companies.208 Second, 
many shareholder proposals are negotiated and withdrawn and therefore do not 
actually appear on a proxy statement, suggesting that the appearance of an actual 
proposal may mean that management was not receptive to the activist’s agenda and 
is unlikely to be supportive of proposed actions.209  
Our review of climate change resolutions210 brought in the United States since 
2011 under the banner of the Ceres’ Investor Network on Climate Risk211 indicates 
that a significant and increasing number of these resolutions are proceeding to be 
considered at annual shareholders’ meetings and receiving relatively high voting 
rates.212 Major investment managers and asset owners are also playing an 
increasingly influential role via their voting practices, with significant players, such 
as BlackRock, openly stating their intention to vote in favor of proposals that support 
transparent disclosure and management of climate risks.213 This trend is well 
                                                                                                                 
 
 207. Id. at 1171. 
 208. Goranova & Ryan, supra note 176, at 1243; Rehbein et al., supra note 182. 
 209. Goranova & Ryan, supra note 176, at 1252 (quoting Shamsud D. Chowdhury & Eric 
Zengxiang Wang, Institutional Activism Types and CEO Compensation: A Time-Series 
Analysis of Large Canadian Corporations, 35 J. MGMT. 5 (2009)). 
 210. This includes resolutions in the following categories (as identified by Ceres): climate 
change, carbon asset risk, coal, energy efficiency (buildings, products, and utilities), 
greenhouse gas emissions, methane emissions, and renewables. 
 211. Ceres is a nonprofit organization which seeks to mobilize a powerful network of 
investors, companies, and public interest groups to accelerate and expand the adoption of 
sustainable business practices and solutions to build a healthy global economy. In 2003, Ceres 
launched the Investor Network on Climate Risk (INCR) which now boasts over 161 
institutional investor members managing more than $25.2 trillion in collective assets. See 
Ceres Investor Network, CERES, https://www.ceres.org/networks/ceres-investor-network 
[https://perma.cc/LE33-9FCB]. 
 212. This observation is based on data available in the Ceres Climate and Sustainability 
Shareholder Resolutions Database which records all resolutions filed by network members 
since 2011. This searchable database indicates whether resolutions were considered by the 
general meeting and if so, the voting rates, or conversely whether they were omitted or 
withdrawn, including whether they were withdrawn with a commitment made by management. 
See Shareholder Resolutions, CERES, https://tools.ceres.org/resources/tools/resolutions 
/@@resolutions_s3_view [https://perma.cc/9RPQ-A4A2]. 
 213. In March 2017, BlackRock released a statement on their engagement strategy on 
climate risk, which stated:  
Consistent with our long-term value focus and “engagement first” process, where 
shareholder proposals on climate risk clearly address a gap in investment-
decision and stewardship relevant disclosure, that we believe will lead to material 
economic disadvantage to the company and its shareholders if not addressed, and 
management’s response to our prior engagement has been inadequate, we will 
consider voting in favor of proposals that would address our concern. Ultimately 
the board is responsible for protecting the long-term economic interests of 
shareholders and we may vote against the re-election of certain directors where 
we believe they have not fulfilled that duty, particularly in markets where 
shareholder proposals are not common. 
BLACKROCK, HOW BLACKROCK INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP ENGAGES ON CLIMATE CHANGE 2 
(2017), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-us/literature/market-commentary/how-
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illustrated by the majority votes received for climate change resolutions at three 
major fossil fuel companies (Occidental Petroleum, PPL, and ExxonMobil) in 2017 
and the key role that large asset owners played in achieving these votes.214 Further, 
the Ceres data highlights that a significant proportion of climate-related proposals 
are being withdrawn by shareholders who are satisfied that the target company has 
agreed to respond to the proposal.215 These figures, particularly the significant rate 
of withdrawal on the basis of ongoing engagement and negotiations, suggest that 
climate-related proposals together with associated engagement may be having some 
impact on company decision-making, at least in helping to drive more transparency 
and better quality disclosure of climate-change-related business risks.216 Moreover, 
like the disclosure investigations discussed in the previous Section, shareholder 
proposals on climate change are also being deployed strategically in numerous 
comparable jurisdictions around the world, adding to the potential spill-over effects 
on companies in similar sectors and industries.217 At the very least, we can say that 
                                                                                                                 
 
blackrock-investment-stewardship-engages-on-climate-risk-march2017.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/VV7M-5U39]. 
 214. See Posner, supra note 183. Posner suggested these successful resolutions may mark 
the beginning of a new trend with, “companies most subject to climate change risk are . . . 
likely to be seeing an onslaught of similar proposals in the future” and large asset owners are 
increasingly willing to push for improved action on climate risks. Id.  
 215. See supra note 212. 
 216. Of interest here is a recent statement by BlackRock regarding their ongoing 
engagement with Chevron Corporation on issues of climate risk. BLACKROCK, ENGAGEMENT 
LEADS TO DISCLOSURE IMPROVEMENT AT CHEVRON (2017), https://www.blackrock 
.com/corporate/en-us/literature/publication/blk-vote-bulletin-chevron-may-2017.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/L949-QNKU]. BlackRock outlines comprehensive engagement activities which led 
them to vote with management against shareholder proposals seeking particular climate risk 
reporting initiatives in 2016 on the basis that they were confident that the company was 
appropriately considering climate risk and was committed to ongoing improvement of 
disclosures. They also discuss and commend the withdrawal of similar shareholder proposals 
by activist shareholders who were equally satisfied that Chevron was making sufficient 
progress on climate risk disclosure. Id. 
 217. For example, the Australasian Centre for Corporate Responsibility lodged a number 
of special shareholder resolutions with the largest Australian banks in the 2015 AGM season 
seeking amendments to the various company constitutions. One amendment stated  
[t]hat, each year at about the time of the release of the Annual Report, at 
reasonable cost and omitting any proprietary information, the Directors report to 
shareholders their assessment of the quantum of greenhouse gas emissions we 
are responsible for financing calculated, for example, in accordance with 
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Protocol guidance. 
Climate – Big Banks, AUSTRALASIAN CENTRE FOR CORP. RESP., 
https://accr.org.au/climate/big-banks/ [https://perma.cc/AT9B-BGT8]. In the United 
Kingdom, Shareaction, ClientEarth, and the Aiming for “A” Coalition have brought a number 
of shareholder resolutions to the annual general meetings of large fossil fuel companies 
seeking improved disclosure of climate change risk. Notably, these resolutions received very 
high voting percentages. See, e.g., Shell Follows BP with Climate Change Resolution, 
CLIENTEARTH (May 19, 2015), https://www.clientearth.org/shell-follows-bp-with-climate-
change-resolution [https://perma.cc/N69P-EP4M]. 
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this type of shareholder activism shows no sign of decreasing and is contributing to 
the growing pressure on companies to pursue clean energy reinvestment pathways.  
D. Fiduciary Duties 
Another legal strategy advocated by some activists is to bring fiduciary duty 
lawsuits against companies that face significant exposure to risk from climate 
change. The argument is that the directors and officers of such companies should 
manage such risks by switching from fossil fuels to other energy investments. This 
strategy has synergies with the above described approach of considering fiduciary 
duties of investment managers, but instead focuses on duties of managers of 
operating companies. This Section analyzes the extent to which company directors’ 
duties allow or require them to consider goals other than the financial returns of their 
shareholders. It also considers the viability of fiduciary duty lawsuits against 
operating company officers and directors.218 
The Section considers both statutory and case law to explore the contours of 
fiduciary duty in this context. The basic structure of fiduciary duty law applicable to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 218. Our focus is on the scope of fiduciary duties in U.S., and particularly Delaware, law. 
However, it is interesting here to note the emergence of legal opinions from senior barristers 
in comparable common law jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and Australia, 
suggesting that the risk of litigation against a company director (or indeed company auditors 
or other professional advisers) for a failure to adequately disclose and manage the financial 
risks posed by climate change is increasingly likely. For example, see the legal opinion issued 
by leading Australian barristers Noel Hutley SC and Sebastian Hartford-Davis in late 2016 
outlining potential liability implications for company directors and others who fail to consider 
and disclose foreseeable climate risks and cautioning that such litigation is “only a matter of 
time.” NOEL HUTLEY SC & SEBASTIAN HARTFORD-DAVIS, CLIMATE CHANGE AND DIRECTOR’S 
DUTIES: MEMORANDUM OF OPINION (2016), https://cpd.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/10 
/Legal-Opinion-on-Climate-Change-and-Directors-Duties.pdf [https://perma.cc/MW8W 
-XPYQ]. For further discussion of litigation risk associated with climate change including for 
breach of fiduciary duties, see MINTER ELLISON & 2 DEGREES INVESTING INITIATIVE, supra 
note 139. For an opinion on the legal duties and litigation risks faced by pension fund trustees 
in Australia, see NOEL HUTLEY & JAMES MACK, MARKET FORCES: SUPERANNUATION FUND 
TRUSTEE DUTIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE RISK: MEMORANDUM OF OPINION (2017). For the U.K. 
context, see, for example, KEITH BRYANT & JAMES RICKARDS, THE LEGAL DUTIES OF PENSION 
FUND TRUSTEES IN RELATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: ABRIDGED JOINT OPINION (2016), https:// 
www.documents.clientearth.org/wp-content/uploads/library/2016-12-02-the-legal-duties-of 
-pension-fund-trustees-qc-opinion-ext-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/JRX8-MCZ5]; CLIENTEARTH, 
RISKY BUSINESS: CLIMATE CHANGE AND PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY RISKS FOR AUDITORS 
(2017), https://www.documents.clientearth.org/wp-content/uploads/library/2017-12-13-risky 
-business-climate-change-and-professional-liability-risks-for-auditors-ce-en.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/KHE5-DQZ6]. As we shall see, the chances of success of such suits in the United 
States are extremely low. Given that traditionally corporate law duty suits have been more 
frequent and successful in the United States than in the United Kingdom, and other similar 
countries, it would surprise us if this legal theory proved more successful outside the United 
States, but time will tell. On the greater frequency of corporate law duty suits in the United 
States., see John Armour, Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Richard Nolan, Private 
Enforcement of Corporate Law: An Empirical Comparison of the United States, and the 
United Kingdom, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 687 (2009). 
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companies is similar to the above-described law applicable to investors. The directors 
and officers of a corporation are subject to both the duty of loyalty and the duty of 
care. These require them faithfully and with an adequate degree of care to pursue the 
best interests of the corporation.219 
Questions as to how the law conceives the best interests of the corporation have 
been the subject of a long-running debate in corporate law.220 The dominant position 
is that the sole appropriate goal of a business corporation is to maximize the financial 
return to its shareholders (shareholders approach).221 A persistent competing position 
holds that the corporation should consider the interests not just of shareholders, but 
also of a variety of other stakeholders involved in a corporation, including its 
creditors, employees, customers, suppliers, and the local community and 
environment (stakeholders approach).222 
There is much variation across countries regarding how the law treats these 
competing theories of corporate purpose. The U.S. case law and statutory law does 
not fully resolve the issue. Statutes on corporate purpose give little basis for choosing 
between the shareholder and the stakeholder approaches.223 Prior to the 1980s, 
commentators relied heavily on one case for the assertion that the shareholder 
approach is correct: Dodge v. Ford.224  
However, two developments pointing in opposite directions have shifted this 
discourse. First, several cases in Delaware, the leading state of incorporation for 
publicly traded U.S. corporations, have included a clearer statement of the 
shareholder value maximization position. The first of these cases held that when 
control of a corporation is being sold, the board has a duty to focus solely on getting 
the best price for its shareholders that it can.225 This case thus asserted the shareholder 
value norm, but only in a quite limited factual setting. A more recent case asserted 
that norm in a different factual setting, namely regarding the adoption of defenses 
                                                                                                                 
 
 219. Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Fiduciary Duties: The Emerging Jurisprudence, 
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 133, 134–35 (Claire A. Hill 
& Brett H. McDonnell eds. 2012). 
 220. The debate goes back at least to the nineteen thirties. See A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate 
Powers As Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom 
Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932). 
 221. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 35–39 (1991); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and 
Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 574–92 (2002); Berle, supra note 
220; Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is To Increase Its Profit, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970. 
 222. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 
85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999); Dodd, supra note 220; Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate 
Law After Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. L. 1 (2014). 
 223. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2011) (“A corporation may be incorporated or 
organized under this chapter to conduct or promote any lawful business or purposes . . . .”); 
MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 3.01 (2016) (“Every corporation incorporated under 
this Act has the purpose of engaging in any lawful business unless a more limited purpose is 
set forth in the articles of incorporation.”). 
 224. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
 225. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986). 
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against hostile takeovers.226 And several recent articles by the Chief Justice of the 
Delaware Supreme Court assert that the shareholder value maximization norm 
applies in all contexts.227 
Second, pointing in the opposite direction, towards a stakeholder approach, is a 
series of statutes adopted in states other than Delaware. These corporate constituency 
statutes posit that directors and officers may take into account the interests of a 
variety of specified groups, including those listed above in describing the stakeholder 
approach.228 There is some debate over the appropriate scope of these statutes. Some 
claim they should be interpreted only as allowing managers to consider the interests 
of other constituents to the extent that doing so furthers the interest of shareholders.229 
However, others argue that this limiting interpretation seems to bely the importance 
that was attached to these constituency statutes when they were adopted.230 Slightly 
over half of all states have a constituency statute,231 making the interpretation of these 
statutes critical to emerging efforts at establishing fiduciary duties regarding climate 
change for managers of operating companies.  
Another barrier to these suits is the business judgment rule. For cases not 
involving a conflict of interest, courts are generally unwilling to second guess the 
business decisions of corporate directors. To succeed in a case not involving a 
conflict of interest, one must show that the directors violated a law, did not act in 
good faith, or that the decision in question was so irrational that it amounted to giving 
away corporate assets.232 
If the challenge is not brought to a specific corporate decision, but rather to the 
general corporate policy and risk profile, the prospects of success are similarly bleak. 
Delaware precedent does allow suits claiming that a corporation’s risk management 
has inadequately guarded against the risk of failing to comply with the law.233 
However, the chances of succeeding in such a suit are quite slim, and Delaware 
                                                                                                                 
 
 226. See eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 227. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-Profit 
Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135 (2012); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The 
Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and 
Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 761 (2015). 
 228. See supra text accompanying note 222.  
 229. Committee on Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential for 
Confusion, 45 BUS. LAW. 2253, 2269 (1990). 
 230. Id. at 2266. The statutes were adopted to give corporate boards more leeway to block 
hostile takeovers. In Minnesota, for example, the legislature was called into special session to 
adopt a constituency statute in response to a takeover threat posed to a leading in-state 
corporation, Dayton’s. See Minnesota Passes Law to Help Thwart Takeover of Dayton 
Hudson, L.A. TIMES (June 26, 1987), http://articles.latimes.com/1987-06-26/business/fi 
-6717_1_dayton-hudson [https://perma.cc/UF4E-CX4Q]. 
 231. Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and False 
Fears, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 95. 
 232. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). Another possibility is to a show that 
the board was grossly negligent in informing itself before making the decision. However, 
corporations can adopt provisions preventing director financial liability in such circumstances, 
and most do so. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011). 
 233. See In re Caremark Int’l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
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courts have been reluctant to extend this risk management line of cases beyond the 
risk of legal noncompliance to more general financial risk.234 
Some climate change and other environmental and social activists are highly 
critical of the shareholder value maximization norm and see it as a leading force 
blocking corporate action to speed energy transition.235 However, the same business 
judgment rule that blocks shareholders from forcing the corporate board to be more 
proactive also allows those boards to be more proactive if they wish to. As long as 
the board makes any sort of plausible link between a more sustainable corporate 
policy and long-run returns to shareholders, courts are quite likely to defer to that 
business judgment.236 
Thus, the law of corporate purpose and duty is largely agnostic on climate change, 
allowing corporate boards and officers significant flexibility in their approach to the 
transition to less carbon-intensive energy. It may well be that various features of 
business corporations do create pressure to focus on shareholder value and on 
relatively short-term profits, although that is disputed.237 If so, those features are 
largely structural, including the fact that shareholders are the sole constituency that 
elects boards, as well as the rise of activist shareholder investors238 and executive 
compensation tied to share value.239 Fiduciary duty law has little compelling legal 
effect, although it may play a significant role in helping set or reinforce norms of 
good corporate behavior.240 
Finally, not all corporations are structured around maximizing shareholder 
returns. As explored in the following Part, for a small but growing number of 
corporations, the law does require taking into account various environmental and 
social interests. That is a leading legal characteristic of a new type of entity called 
the benefit corporation.241 Benefit corporations are mostly governed by the law of 
(for-profit) business corporations, but they are governed by different rules on three 
points: (1) their purpose must be to pursue general public benefit as well as 
                                                                                                                 
 
 234. For a more extended analysis reaching a similar conclusion as to the long odds of 
success for duty suits in the United States., see Risley, supra note 9. 
 235. See, e.g., LINN ANKER-SØRENSEN, BLANAID CLARKE, ANDREW JOHNSTON, CAROL 
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shareholder value;242 (2) their directors and officers have a fiduciary duty to consider 
the effect of their decisions on a variety of specified stakeholder groups;243 and (3) 
they must regularly report on what they have done to promote the general public 
benefit.244 Given these rules, in theory, a shareholder suit against a corporation on 
climate change grounds could have more basis.245 However, there are still very few 
benefit corporations in existence, just a few thousand, and most of them are very 
small. These companies generally do not have a significant greenhouse gas emissions 
profile that would lead to lawsuits against them but may instead be of value in the 
second pathway of encouraging reinvestment.246  
III. EMERGING LEGAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENERGY ENTREPRENEURS 
Part II focused upon several kinds of legal and political strategies. The divestment 
movement encourages various institutional investors to take their investment out of 
companies that are too heavily involved in fossil fuels. Shareholder activism through 
lobbying, proposals, and duty or disclosure suits attempts to persuade large 
companies to move their internal investments from fossil fuels to renewable energy. 
In different ways, these strategies attempt to change the behavior of, or take resources 
from, existing large energy-related companies that are heavily exposed to fossil fuels. 
Although those large existing companies can and do invest in innovations in 
renewable energy,247 they are not the only drivers of innovation and refocused 
investment in energy resources. Companies with heavy, longstanding investments in 
fossil fuels will often find it hard to break entirely with their old ways of doing things. 
Disruption will often entail large financial losses on their old investments and also 
will often disrupt the careers of employees whose expertise lie with fossil fuel 
technologies. Thus, much investment in renewable energy and clean energy 
innovation will likely come from newer companies.248 Also, companies that have a 
legal purpose of advancing public goals and sustainability may be more likely to 
support these investments.249  
Recall the above quote from Bill Gates:250 investors should be looking not just to 
remove money from companies that are hurting the environment, but also to give 
money to companies that are committed to leading the way to a future based on 
sustainable forms of energy. This second pathway is critical to achieving the goals 
of energy transition. This Part explores two recent legal developments that help 
encourage such investment. The first reduces securities law costs for some forms of 
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investment in smaller, newer businesses.251 The second creates new legal forms for 
social enterprises that have dual goals of generating profits while also pursuing social 
goals.252 
A. Start-Up and Project Investment 
Some investment in technology surrounding energy transition is occurring within 
already existing large corporations, particularly in the energy field.253 However, other 
investment occurs through funding smaller new start-up companies. A significant 
amount of funding of new technology and research in emerging areas such as wind, 
solar, and energy storage is occurring through start-ups. Solar City, for instance, 
makes and installs solar panels. In its first decade it grew into a company with over 
10,000 employees.254 Ormat Technologies has built over 150 power plants, mostly 
geothermal and solar.255 The most famous renewable start-up is Tesla.256 More 
generally, renewable energy start-ups grew from receiving a negligible share of 
venture capital financing at the turn of the millennium to over 15% by 2011, although 
its share has fallen more recently.257  
There are major advantages in encouraging energy transition investments in start-
ups. First, it opens up a new category of investors and hence a source of funds. Some 
investors prefer investing in start-ups to investing in public companies—the risks are 
much greater, but so are the potential rewards.258 A second, perhaps more important 
reason, is that a thriving start-up sector can explore a greater number of new ideas 
and approaches, allowing for more diverse perspectives as to what technologies 
might be worth trying. Also, unlike major existing energy or transportation 
companies, new start-ups are less tied to the status quo.259 If a new technology risks 
disrupting that status quo and thus hurting existing investments and relationships, 
entrepreneurs starting new companies will have few qualms about doing so. 
Assuming that we are better off exploring a wide range of possible approaches to 
handling energy transition, creating a legal and financial environment that 
encourages entrepreneurship is an attractive option. 
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Securities law can be a significant barrier to investment in start-up companies, but 
recent changes in the law may be easing that barrier. Of particular note are new rules 
providing more space for equity crowdfunding and related activities. 
Securities law forms a barrier to new investment through its requirement that any 
issuance of a security must be registered with the SEC unless it is subject to an 
exemption from the registration requirement.260 Shares in corporations are 
securities,261 and equity interests in other kinds of business associations such as 
limited liability companies may also be securities, depending on the nature of the 
interest.262 Some kinds of debt investments are also security interests.263 Thus, many 
kinds of investment in start-up companies will count as security interests, and hence 
must be registered unless subject to an exemption. Registration with the SEC is 
prohibitively expensive for new businesses, costing hundreds of thousands of dollars 
or more with ongoing costs for required disclosures once a company has gone 
public.264 Hence, new businesses must either seek investments that do not take the 
form of security interests or else structure their offering of securities in a way that 
qualifies for an exemption from the registration requirement. 
There are a variety of exemptions to the registration requirement available. 
However, each exemption comes with its own set of limitations. The in-state 
exemption requires all sales to occur within one state.265 A family of exemptions 
cover private offerings, in which the number and kind of persons who buy the 
securities are limited.266 However, these offerings restrict how an offering can be 
publicized, who can buy, the amount that can be raised, and in some cases require 
that fairly extensive information be given to the buyers. Depending upon the 
situation, one or more of these limitations can be quite onerous. 
As noted, though, new rules have loosened some of these limitations. Of particular 
note is the JOBS Act,267 passed in 2012. This Act, among other things, eliminated a 
major constraint on one of the most popular exemptions and created a new 
exemption. As to the former, a family of several exemptions was created by the SEC 
in Regulation D.268 This has become a leading go-to source of exemption for many 
security offerings. However, one major limitation for all Regulation D offerings was 
that there could be no “general solicitation.” This was strictly construed by the SEC 
and severely limited what issuers or those aiding them could do to publicize an 
offering.269 The JOBS Act eliminated the general solicitation prohibition in 
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Regulation D offerings.270 Among other things, this should make it possible to put 
Regulation D offerings online and make them more widely known. 
This change enhances the potential for new companies in the clean energy field 
to find investors by listing their offerings online and actively advertising those 
offerings online as well. That may become one way in which investors engage in 
equity crowdfunding, which is described further below. However, Regulation D 
offerings still restrict buyers to “accredited investors,” who (among other things) 
must have an annual income of more than $200,000 ($300,000 for married couples) 
or a net worth of more than $1,000,000.271 Those requirements severely limit who 
can invest in Regulation D offerings. To realize the full potential benefits of 
crowdfunding, a rule without that limit is needed. The JOBS Act created such a rule. 
Crowdfunding, broadly speaking, involves raising money for activities by 
soliciting to the general public online. Crowdfunding has been around for many 
years, with the best-known crowdfunding site being Kickstarter.272 Until now, 
though, crowdfunding has been limited to donative or rewards versions. In a donative 
version, funders simply give money to a person, company, or project and receive 
nothing in exchange. In a rewards version, funders do receive something in return. 
That something may be a small gift item, or it may be a promise to receive an item 
of the good or service being funded. 
What crowdfunders have not been able to receive is stock or bonds issued by a 
business being funded. That would constitute the offer and sale of securities, and no 
previous exemption allowed such an offer and sale to the general public. Pursuant to 
the new rules created by the JOBS Act, crowdfunding issuers may now put their 
offers online for the general public to see; however, only accredited investors may 
buy.273 
But another section of the JOBS Act created a new exemption intended to allow 
the crowdfunding of securities to nonaccredited investors,274 and the SEC has 
recently put into place the regulations needed to make this exemption available.275 
The intention is to make equity and debt crowdfunding an important new way for 
smaller businesses to raise money.276 This new source of fundraising is not specific 
to energy transition or related industries and investments, but it could be used by new 
businesses in the area. 
However, the new crowdfunding rules are subject to particular restrictions, 
similarly to other exemptions. There has been much debate over these restrictions, 
with many arguing that they are too tight, and hence that the new rules will not work 
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as intended to create a major market for securities crowdfunding.277 Time will tell 
whether these concerns are realized. The rest of this Section details the rules and 
argues that if they do turn out to be quite restrictive, Congress or the SEC should 
explore ways to loosen them, so as to encourage a wider range of investment in new 
businesses. 
The new crowdfunding rules have a number of restrictions. Among the most 
important are the following: 
 No more than $1,070,000 can be raised in one crowdfunded offering.278 Given 
the significant costs created by some of the other restrictions, this may imply 
that issuers will not be able to raise enough money via crowdfunding to justify 
the costs. 
 The amount a person can invest in all crowdfunded offerings in a year is 
capped, with the cap set anywhere from $2000 to $100,000, depending upon 
the person’s income/wealth.279 
 The web sites on which crowdfunding can occur must register with the SEC 
and, through that, are subject to some regulations.280 
 There are limits on how either the issuers or web sites can publicize 
offerings.281 
 Crowdfunding issuers must provide a significant amount of information, 
especially financial information, which may prove costly to produce.282 
Of these, it is the interaction between the limit on the amount that can be raised 
and the costs of producing the required information that has probably caused the most 
skepticism about the financial attractiveness of crowdfunding under the new rules. 
Since the rules went into effect on May 15, 2016, experience with using the new rules 
remains limited. 
Fearing the federal rules will be too costly, many states have enacted 
crowdfunding rules for offerings within their states.283 Of course, limiting investors 
to those in-state is a serious limit, but since investment in businesses tends to be 
localized anyway, if the other limits on these offerings are loose enough, these could 
prove an attractive legal basis for crowdfunding. The SEC has changed its rules on 
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the intrastate offering exemption to make it easier for such offerings to be exempt 
under federal law.284 
So, through a combination of the technological and social invention of the internet 
with new legal rules, crowdfunding could become a major new way for new and 
small businesses to raise money, including businesses pursuing ideas for speeding 
energy transition.285 Experience over the next few years should help clarify how far 
the new rules go in allowing securities crowdfunding. 
If it turns out that the new rules remain quite restrictive, so that they are not widely 
used, the benefits of new sources of investment for innovative start-ups discussed 
above suggest strongly considering further loosening of the rules. Of course, there 
are costs that must be considered as well—less restrictive rules will make online 
securities fraud easier and more common.286 The costs and benefits of that broader 
tradeoff are beyond the scope of this Article; it focuses on a particular kind of benefit 
focused on one specific, albeit quite economically and socially important, area of 
new business and investment. 
Despite this limitation, we think this discussion offers a useful perspective that 
cuts against the grain of the usual politics of both environmental and financial 
regulation, which is important at this moment of intense partisanship around energy 
and climate change.287 Those urging aggressive action to combat climate change tend 
to fall on the left end of the political spectrum and to be seen as favoring aggressive 
government regulation. Persons on that end of the spectrum also tend to favor more 
aggressive forms of financial regulation. Yet this Section argues that a form of 
financial deregulation could be a major aid in the fight against climate change. It 
does so by calling attention to the highly useful role that can be played by investments 
in new, small businesses and projects. In the area of investment in energy transition, 
an opportunity exists for bipartisanship that could support energy transition because 
of potentially substantial economic benefits of reducing financial regulation.288 
Sometimes, addressing climate change may be achieved not by strengthening 
regulations but rather by loosening them. 
B. Social Enterprise and Benefit Corporations 
As noted in the prior Part’s discussion of fiduciary duties, one concern about 
convincing the managers of corporations to make choices that speed energy 
transition is that an exclusive focus on the bottom line of increasing shareholder value 
makes those managers deaf to the appeal of avoiding climate change unless doing so 
advances that bottom line. At any rate, nothing in their duty to the corporation 
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requires them to take the effect of their decisions on the environment independently 
into account.289 
But recent years have seen the growth of a new kind of business, one that straddles 
the gap between for-profits and nonprofits. These social enterprises pursue dual 
goals: achieving profits for their equity investors, while also pursuing specific or 
general social goods.290 They are meant to attract entrepreneurs, investors, 
employees, and customers who want attractive financial outcomes while also making 
the world a better place. As indicated above,291 start-ups are already playing a 
significant role in advancing cleaner energy technologies. However, social 
enterprises can and are helping push that investment further. Social enterprises may 
be willing to take on projects that conventional for-profits will not, either because 
expected returns are too low, or the risks are too high, or profits may take too long 
to achieve. Indeed, social enterprises have been involved in the renewable energy 
field for some time.292 
Over the past decade or so, several new legal forms of business association have 
been created to help address the special needs of social enterprises. The leading new 
form, the benefit corporation, was briefly described earlier. As noted above,293 
benefit corporations are mostly governed by ordinary for-profit corporation law, but 
their purpose and fiduciary duties focus on creating social benefits as well as profits, 
and they must regularly report on what they have done to create social benefits. 
Benefit corporations, unlike nonprofits, allow equity investors to earn a financial 
return, while unlike ordinary for-profits, there is no legal concern that pursuing 
public goods at the expense of profit may violate any fiduciary duty.294  
More critically, the duty to pursue public benefits and report on that pursuit may 
act as a commitment device.295 Investors, employees, and consumers may want to 
become involved in social enterprises but may fear that a business that bills itself as 
socially committed may be making an unserious claim. If a business is a benefit 
corporation, though, investors who believe that has happened may be able to sue, 
claiming a breach of the duty to pursue public benefits. They will also receive a 
regular report about what the business has done for the public good and may also be 
able to sue if they believe that report is fraudulent.296 
So far, several thousand companies have chosen to be benefit corporations.297 
These are mostly small, closely held businesses, many of them newly formed. Some 
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benefit corporations choose to be certified as B corps by B Lab, the entity that came 
up with the idea of benefit corporations. Of 1774 B Lab certified companies, twenty-
one are in the industry category labelled “Renewable Energy Generation & 
Installation.”298 
Benefit corporations are not the only new legal form designed for social 
enterprises. Social welfare corporations,299 and in Minnesota specific benefit 
corporations,300 are like benefit corporations, but focused on only a specifically 
identified public benefit, rather than committed to pursuing a broad range of public 
benefits.301 The low-profit limited liability company, or L3C, is a limited liability 
company (LLC) which furthers one or more charitable purpose and “no significant 
purpose of the company is the production of income or the appreciation of 
property.”302 The cited language comes from the definition of program-related 
investments under federal tax laws,303 and L3Cs were created as potential vehicles 
for such tax-favored investments by charitable foundations. So far, though, the IRS 
has refused to recognize any special status for investments in L3Cs, and scholars 
have questioned the logic of the form.304 Three states have created benefit LLCs, 
which have the purpose and duty features of benefit corporations, but based on the 
LLC form.305 Also of note is the new generation of cooperative statutes which allows 
for equity investors who are not members of a cooperative’s class of patron-
owners.306 
All of these new legal entity types are in their infancy, all have relatively few 
adopters, and there are serious questions about each of them. These questions in part 
flow from debates about social enterprise more generally, above all the so-called 
“two masters” problem.307 Can entities really commit to pursuing independently both 
profit and the public good? How will they behave when the two conflict? How can 
outside investors and others tell that they are following through on that dual 
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commitment? Perhaps it will turn out that social enterprises ultimately flounder in 
the face of these questions, but so far these questions remain unresolved. 
Moreover, social enterprises involved in energy transition present potentially 
attractive investments for a variety of types of institutions and persons interested in 
directing their money towards businesses that are addressing climate change. 
Depending upon both the person giving money and the company receiving it, 
investments can take many forms, including: 
 donations; 
 loans at below market rates; 
 loans at market rates; 
 preferred shares, at below market or market rates; or 
 common equity. 
For one important type of potential investor, charitable foundations, a legal 
restriction discussed above308 may limit their ability to invest in social enterprises. 
Investments that jeopardize a foundation’s charitable purpose through low returns 
are subject to an excise tax.309 However, there is an exception to this rule for 
program-related investments (PRI), defined as “investments, the primary purpose of 
which is to accomplish one or more of the purposes described in section 
170(c)(2)(B), and no significant purpose of which is the production of income or the 
appreciation of property, shall not be considered as investments which jeopardize the 
carrying out of exempt purposes.”310 
To qualify as a PRI, it must thus be the case that “no significant purpose” is “the 
production of income.”311 Much uncertainty surrounds the interpretation of this 
language, making many foundations cautious in relying on the PRI exception.312 
Although the IRS recently provided more guidance on types of investments that do 
and do not count as PRI, it explicitly refused to give more guidance as to how status 
under one of the social enterprise statutes might help establish an organization as a 
proper recipient of PRI.313 If returns on an investment are low enough (e.g., a very 
low-interest loan), that can help ensure an investment will be treated as a PRI. 
However, the closer an investment comes to a market-rate return, the harder it may 
be to ensure the IRS will refuse to treat it as PRI.314 This may discourage foundations 
from a range of investments that fall in-between market-rate returns and quite low 
returns. Many potential investments in social enterprises could fall in that range. 
The new economic and social institutions discussed in this and the previous 
subsection may be usefully combined. For instance, social enterprises may raise 
                                                                                                                 
 
 308. See supra notes 104–108 and accompanying text. 
 309. I.R.C. § 4944 (2012). 
 310. Id. § 4944(c). 
 311. Id. 
 312. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 89, at 279. 
 313. IRS Examples of Program-Related Investments, 81 Fed. Reg. 24014, 24016 (Apr. 25, 
2016). 
 314. Under the regulations implementing the PRI rules, “in determining whether a 
significant purpose of an investment is the production of income or the appreciation of 
property, it shall be relevant whether investors solely engaged in the investment for profit 
would be likely to make the investment on the same terms as the private foundation.” Treas. 
Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(2)(iii) (2016). 
648 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 94:595 
 
money by crowdfunding. Crowdfunding began with pure donations, so investors 
interested in crowdfunding already start with a vision that is not purely focused on 
economic returns.
 315 And both crowdfunding and social enterprise are new social 
phenomena that appeal especially to a younger generation of investors.316 
Like crowdfunding, the new social enterprise statutes represent a departure in 
regulatory approach for progressives and environmental activists. New business 
forms like benefit corporations are enabling legislation but are not prescriptive. The 
new alternative is there to help solve problems faced by a growing group of 
entrepreneurs and investors. If any of the new statutes succeed in addressing this 
emerging social need, they will thrive; if not, then they will not. This promarket, 
enabling approach helps explain the rapid growth of benefit corporation statutes in a 
partisan environment: liberals like social responsibility, and conservatives appreciate 
the market-based approach.317 
Finally, it is worth noting that the existence of innovative new companies in the 
start-up and social enterprise sectors discussed in this and the previous subsection 
has feedback effects on the strategy and behavior of large established companies that 
have significant investments in fossil fuel energy sources. As these status quo 
organizations face new challengers (and see new market opportunities), they may 
feel pressure to diversify their investments and research, so that if cleaner energy 
does come to dominate the world economy in the future, those companies have a 
chance of surviving in that new world. For example, a number of the world’s largest 
oil and gas companies are increasingly investing in renewable energy and energy 
storage.318 
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS MORE EFFECTIVE PRIVATE SECTOR ENERGY TRANSITION 
This Article explores how corporate and securities law mechanisms can both shift 
investment patterns away from carbon-intensive fossil fuels and encourage 
reinvestment in clean energy technology. It argues that energy divestment strategies 
alone are insufficient.319 Regarding the fossil fuel divestment movement—its high-
profile successes and moral force notwithstanding—significant questions remain 
over its direct economic effects on the carbon market economy and the current 
market dominance by fossil fuels.320 Other strategies which have a direct or indirect 
goal of promoting a shift in investment away from fossil fuels—such as those 
harnessing disclosure requirements, shareholder proposals or fiduciary duties of 
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company or trustee directors—have achieved some modest results to date.321 
However, whether greater climate risk disclosure by companies translates to cleaner 
energy business practices over the longer term is more difficult to assess at this 
juncture.322 Also, legal questions regarding whether the scope of fiduciary duties 
allow directors and fund managers to take proactive measures on climate change are 
largely untested and substantial barriers remain; these include incentives for short-
term profit maximization over long-term climate risk management and concerns 
about how courts might construe the requirements of the business judgement rule.323 
But even if challenges to the transformational impact of current divestment 
strategies were less daunting, they also face a more fundamental limitation. Key to 
realizing the potential of energy divestment strategies in private sector energy 
transition will be creating pathways for reinvestment in clean energy technologies, 
from R&D to bringing them to market scale.324 Conventional mechanisms for 
facilitating energy investment, such as subsidies, can be and are being used to do 
so.325 However, their impact on energy continues to be mixed, particularly in the U.S. 
context where subsidies promote renewable energy development but also underpin 
the continuing dominance of fossil fuels.326  
Other legal tools for supporting reinvestment canvassed in Part III have received 
far less attention by scholars, policymakers, and advocates focused on 
decarbonization. But they offer important potential to enhance energy reinvestment. 
These pathways, based on new rules introduced by the JOBS Act for crowdfunding 
start-ups and innovations in corporation law to enable novel forms of social 
enterprise through benefit corporations, have the potential to combine in useful ways 
to aid investment flows to clean energy companies.327 In particular, they offer the 
potential for opening up investment in clean energy start-ups to a new range of 
smaller investors and for forming companies with explicit social and environmental 
goals in contrast to solely for-profit ones.328 
Clearly, we are only at the beginning of efforts to explore the role played by 
evolving corporate and financial tools in fostering private sector energy transition. 
However, as these efforts evolve, it will be important to consider the synergies among 
different divestment and reinvestment pathways and how they might be more closely 
tied together to promote essential energy transition and mitigation of greenhouse gas 
emissions to avert dangerous climate change.  
This Article began, in its introduction, by mapping how external investment and 
internal corporate decision-making could operate synergistically to encourage 
divestment and reinvestment. This conclusion builds from that map to propose 
specific strategies for tying the four quadrants of that table together. In so doing, it 
recognizes that key investors and corporations have significantly different 
positionality, and that strategies need to take this positionality into account. It 
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therefore focuses on two categories of important actors for divestment and 
reinvestment—(1) external investors and (2) internal corporate decisionmakers—and 
explores how the options for combining these strategies will vary within them. The 
following figure depicts how those actors interact with the tools in the two pathways. 
 
Figure: Pathways for Energy Reinvestment 
 
For external investors, two key factors will influence what combination of these 
tools will most effectively drive energy reinvestment. First, as explored in depth in 
Section II.A, investors vary significantly in how constrained they are in considering 
factors beyond profit maximization.329 Investors with fewer constraints will be more 
likely to be responsive to pressures to divest, and more open to investment in the new 
types of corporations described in Section III.B.330 
Second, external investors diverge in their level of interest, and perhaps more 
importantly, the level of interest of their key constituencies in a shift to lower-carbon 
energy. Those with higher levels of interest are more likely to be willing to divest 
and use securities disclosure and interpretations of duties to support their 
approaches.331 They also are more likely to be interested in the two types of 
reinvestment described in Part III.332 Depending on their size, the changes in 
securities law in particular may open up new reinvestment opportunities for them.333 
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The combination of these two variables will in turn influence how external 
investors evaluate investment risks and opportunities. Some will include accounting 
of climate change externalities and its likely impact on markets and investments more 
than others. However, those models will vary in the outcomes they produce.334 Those 
whose models incorporate climate change risks are more likely to make securities 
disclosures and consider how their duties relate to this issue, as well as to be 
responsive to calls for divestment and consider the opportunities created by the legal 
developments discussed in Part III.335 
Corporate decisionmakers will similarly vary in how responsive they are to 
divestment and reinvestment strategies in their asset management. Corporations 
differ significantly both in whether and what types of fossil fuels are central to their 
business model. Oil and gas companies generally have higher profit margins and 
more capacity to invest in clean energy technologies than, for example, coal 
companies.336 Moreover, as discussed above, a number of oil and gas companies are 
working to pair natural gas with renewables as electricity sources, reinforcing those 
incentives.337 Fossil fuel companies with existing clean energy investments and 
companies working to create innovative new clean energy technologies are more 
likely to be more open to consideration of climate change risks and to investing in 
additional forms of emerging clean technology. 
Other companies are not directly involved in the energy industry but are major 
consumers of energy through the products that they sell and their operations. Many 
of these companies, like Walmart, Target, and Best Buy, are considering climate 
change risks and working to reduce their carbon footprint, including through energy 
efficiency, sourcing of goods and electricity, etc.338 They might be open to 
investment relationships with clean energy companies as well as responsive to the 
divestment tools. The new companies being formed under the new forms emerging 
under state corporate law, especially clean energy ones, are even more likely to have 
incentives that align well with energy reinvestment.339  
These considerations will affect how constrained corporate decisionmakers are 
(or perceive they are) in responding to pressure and opportunities for energy 
divestment and reinvestment, and their level of interest in utilizing these strategies. 
Mapping out the different combinations of constraints versus interests for both 
external investors and corporate decisionmakers yields the following matrix, with 
actors categorized as either Responsive, Receptive, Reluctant or Recalcitrant with 
respect to their potential to engage in energy divestment and reinvestment strategies. 
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These categories are, of course, simplifications of the more complex and nuanced 
reality of investor and corporate actors involved in energy markets. However, they 
provide a guide for regulators, decarbonization advocates, and private sector entities 
alike to understand which companies and funds are likely to be best positioned to 
engage in fossil fuel divestment and/or lead reinvestment efforts. In turn, this could 
foster better targeting of divestment campaigns and regulatory efforts as well as a 
more nuanced communication and engagement with companies and investors about 
their energy investment options.  
Private sector energy transition will not involve a one-size-fits-all solution. 
Effective action requires an understanding of the energy market context for actors, 
paired with an appreciation of their legal and financial constraints and likely level of 
interest amongst shareholders or other stakeholders in pursuing a shift to lower-
carbon energy. This Article, through its exploration of divestment and reinvestment 
pathways, aims to demonstrate how nuanced strategies can be developed to support 
energy transition through corporate and securities law. 
 
 
 
